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BARTLETT REVISITED: NEW MEXICO TORT LAW TWENTY
YEARS AFTER THE ABOLITION OF JOINT AND SEVERAL
LIABILITY--PART ONE
M.E. OCCHIALINO*
On the twentieth anniversary of the abolition ofjoint and several liability in New
Mexico, this article reviews the development of the New Mexico law of several
liability. Part One, published here, focuses on the substantive scope of the
doctrine, tracing the judicial and legislative developments that have established
the breadth and the limits of several liability. Part Two, which is forthcoming,
will explore the myriad procedural issues that have arisen in the litigation of
several liability cases and the changes in litigation strategies occasioned by the
movement from joint and several liability to several liability. In both Part One
and Part Two, the article compares New Mexico law to that set forth in the
recently adopted Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability in
order to test the soundness of New Mexico's evolving law and to provide New
Mexico's two decades of experience with several liability as a counterpoint to
jurisdictions that might consider adopting the Third Restatement
INTRODUCTION
In 1981, the New Mexico Supreme Court substituted pure comparative
negligence' for the prior doctrine of contributory negligence, which had barred a
plaintiff from any recovery if plaintiff's negligence contributed to the plaintiff's
injuries.2 The decision was not surprising. Although the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, published in 1965, advocated the doctrine of contributory negligence,3 New
Mexico joined thirty-five other states that had rejected the doctrine in favor of some
version of comparative negligence.4
More surprising was the ruling one year later, in 1982, that the logic of
comparative negligence in apportioning liability between plaintiff and defendant
also called for the abolition of the doctrine of joint and several liability between
defendants. In Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc.,' the court of appeals
concluded that defendants whose concurrent negligence caused an injury to the
plaintiff would be only severally liable-liable solely for the percentage of the
plaintiff s total damages that corresponds to that defendant's comparative fault. In
expanding comparative fault principles to apportionment among defendants, New
Mexico moved into largely uncharted territory. Not only had the Restatement
* Dickason Professor of Law, University of New Mexcio School of Law. The author is grateful for the
outstanding research assistance of Ms. Jaime Dawes, a third-year student at the University of New Mexico School
of Law.
1. "Pure" comparative negligence follows "the principle of requiring wrongdoers to share the losses caused,
at the ratio of their respective wrongdoing," and occurs "[riegardless of the degrees of comparative fault of the
parties." Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 689, 634 P.2d 1234, 1241 (1981). In contrast, a typical "modified" system
of comparative negligence "allows a 49% negligent plaintiff to recover 51% of his damages, but denies any recovery
at all to one who is found to have contributed 50% of the total negligence." Id.
2. Scott, 96 N.M. at 682, 634 P.2d at 1234.
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 467 (1965). The drafters acknowledged in a "Special Note" that
"[iun several states.. statutes.. .have abrogated the rule stated in this Section, and have substituted reduction of the
damages to be recovered by the negligent plaintiff in proportion to his fault." Id.
4. Scott, 96 N.M. at 689, 634 P.2d at 1241.
5. 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794.
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embraced joint and several liability,6 but the Bartlett court could not identify anotherjurisdiction in which a state had adopted several liability by judicial opinion rather
than by statute.7 Finding itself almost alone, New Mexico struggled to develop a
common law jurisprudence of several liability largely without guidance from otherjurisdictions. In 1986, the New Mexico legislature adopted the Several Liability
Act,8 which affirmed thejudiciary's adoption of several liability while creating some
exceptions to which joint and several liability would apply. Several liability had a
profound impact on other aspects of New Mexico law. Numerous issues, both
substantive and procedural, have arisen, most to be resolved by judicial decision,
some by the 1986 legislation, and many still unresolved.
In 2000, the relevant portions of the Restatement were replaced with the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability.9 The Third Restatement
is divided into five "Topics." The first Topic establishes rules governing the effect
of plaintiffs negligence in tort actions.'l Because all but five jurisdictions have
adopted some form of comparative negligence," the Third Restatement rejects the
doctrine of contributory negligence enshrined in the Second Restatement, endorses
the doctrine of pure comparative negligence, 2 and proposes rules for determining
comparative fault between plaintiff and defendant.
The second Topic covers the liability of tortfeasors among themselves for in-juries caused to the plaintiff. 13 Noting a lack of consensus on the issue of whetherjoint and several liability should be replaced with several liability and if so, the form
of several liability to adopt, 4 the drafters chose not to incorporate a single doctrine
into the Third Restatement.15 Instead, mirroring the division of views among the
states, Topic Two contains five separate "Tracks" or alternative formulations of the
law applicable to liability among multiple tortfeasors. Track A applies to jurisdic-
tions that have decided to maintain the doctrine of joint and several liability for
multiple tortfeasors. 16 Track B proposes the appropriate law to apply in jurisdic-
tions that have adopted a form of pure several liability, 7 while Tracks C, 8
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965).
7. Bartlett, 98 N.M. at 154, 646 P.2d at 581 ("The question has been answered in several states; most of
these decisions are not helpful because the answer depended upon the contents of the comparative negligence
statute."). Surveying the law of the four jurisdictions that had adopted pure comparative negligence by judicial
decision, the court of appeals conceded that none of the courts had been persuaded thereafter to abolish joint and
several liability. Id. at 154-57, 646 P.2d at 581-84.
8. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1 (Michie 1996).
9. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY (2000).
10. Id. §§ 1-9.
11. Id. § 7 cmt. a ("Now only five jurisdictions-Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia and the
District of Columbia--continue to use contributory negligence.").
12. Id. §7.
13. Id. §§ I-E21.
14. The "five parallel, alternative Tracks (A-E) reflect the fact that there is no majority rule on this
question." Id. at 3.
15. Id. § 17 cmt. a.
16. Id. §§ AI8-A19.
17. Id.§§BI9-B20.
18. Track C provides for joint and several liability unless a defendant jointly and severally liable is unable
to collect a judgment for contribution from a joint tortfeasor, in which case the percentages of fault are reallocated
among the remaining parties. Id. §§ C18-C21.
JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
D, 9 and E20 deal with variations of several liability that some jurisdictions have
adopted. After Topic Two addresses its five tracks, Topics Three, Four, and Five set
forth basic principles applicable to contribution, 21 indemnity,22 the effect of
settlement by some tortfeasors,23 and the treatment to be given to causally-distinct
injuries.24
The general provisions of the Third Restatement relevant to New Mexico law are
Topic One, focusing on comparative negligence between plaintiff and defendant,
and Topics Three, Four, and Five, which address indemnity, contribution, divisible
injury cases, and the effect of settlement by fewer than all tortfeasors. In addition,
because New Mexico has adopted several liability in Bartlett25 and in the Several
Liability Act, 26 Track B ("Several Liability") of the second Topic, concerning
liability of tortfeasors among themselves, contains provisions relevant to New
Mexico law. Though many of the Restatement positions coincide with New Mexico
law, many do not. New Mexico several liability law preceded the Restatement by
almost twenty years and often has taken positions different from those in the
Restatement.
This article traces the New Mexico history of the adoption of comparative
negligence and several liability. It then analyzes the development in New Mexico
of the substantive law of several liability and also focuses on the extent to which the
adoption of several liability has compelled changes in procedural rules and the
litigation tactics of the parties in tort actions. The article compares New Mexico law
and the Third Restatement, noting where they differ and where New Mexico law or
the Restatement has addressed an issue that the other has not considered. Where
New Mexico has not yet resolved an issue for which a Restatement provision
applies, the Restatement position is analyzed to determine its wisdom in the context
of the developed New Mexico law.
TO WHAT DOES SEVERAL LIABILITY APPLY?
With one important exception,27 the New Mexico Several Liability Act28 provides
the core structure for determining when the doctrine of several liability applies. The
Act requires a two-step process. First, one must determine the claims to which the
Act applies. Second, if the Act applies, one must determine whether one of the
19. Track D applies in jurisdictions in which joint and several liability applies to tortfeasors whose
percentage of fault exceeds a certain threshold, while those below the threshold are only severally liable. Id. §§ Dl 8-
D19, § D18 cmt. b.
20. Track E applies in jurisdictions in which joint and several liability applies to one type of damages (e.g.,
economic damages), while several liability applies to different damages (e.g., non-economic damages). Id. §§ E18-
E19.
21. Id.§ 23.
22. Id. § 22.
23. Id. § 24. Section 25 deals with the effect of payment of judgments by one judgment debtor on the
responsibility of other judgment debtors.
24. Id. § 26.
25. Bartlett, 98 N.M. at 159, 646 P.2d at 586.
26. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1 (Michie 1996).
27. See infra notes 178-246 and accompanying text.
28. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1 (Michie 1996).
Winter 2003)
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
exceptions listed in the Act,29 authorizing the continued application of joint and
several liability, applies. This section follows the same two-part approach, first
exploring the scope of the Act and then the exceptions in the Act. The Several
Liability Act is sometimes redundant because in some situations the Act does not
provide that several liability applies and then also states that the same situation is
covered by an exception to the Act that calls for the continued application of joint
and several liability. Where the Act both excludes several liability and an exception
in the Act imposes joint and several liability, this section addresses each of the two
reasons why the doctrine of several liability is not applicable.
New Mexico and the Third Restatement take significantly different approaches
to the issue of the scope of several liability. New Mexico limits several liability to
particular causes of action independent of the type of damages sought to be
recovered.30 In contrast, the Restatement applies several liability to any cause of
action so long as the damages sought are for death, personal injury, or physical
injury to property.31
The Third Restatement thus extends comparative negligence and the rules of
apportionment of liability among tortfeasors to "intentional torts, negligence, strict
liability, nuisance, breach of warranty, misrepresentation, or any other theory of
liability,' 32 though a separate provision of the Restatement imposes joint and several
liability on intentional tortfeasors even in jurisdictions adopting several liability.33
The Restatement rejected the cause of action-by-cause of action approach adopted
in New Mexico because "single lawsuits often contain claims based on several
different theories of liability, and it is desirable that a single system of
apportionment apply to all the claims."34
New Mexico's focus on causes of action to formulate the scope of several liability
was influenced by the genesis of several liability in the adoption of comparative
negligence. In Scott v. Rizzo,35 the supreme court held that comparative negligence
shall substitute for contributory negligence for "a plaintiff suing in negligence, '36
and when other "negligence-related concepts are a basis for liability," 37 while
declining to rule on the possible extension of comparative negligence to cases in
which plaintiff pursued a theory of strict tort liability.38 Thus, the outer boundaries
of fault-based apportionment were set by reference to the plaintiff's legal theory
rather than the type of harm plaintiff suffered.
29. Id. § 41-3A-l(C).
30. Id. § 41-3A-I(A).
31. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 1 (2000). The Restatement includes
within the phrase "personal injury" both emotional distress and consortium. Id.
32. Id. § I cmt. b.
33. Id. § 12 cmt. a. In addition, the Restatement acknowledges that some statutory causes of action may be
outside the scope of the Restatement. Id. § I cmt. d.
34. Id. § I cmt. b. The Restatement also discerns "conceptual tensions" in any attempt to apply different
apportionment rules to different parties of multi-party and multi-claim cases: Causes of action focus on different
policy concerns that underlie each cause of action, while "[t]he intellectual underpinning of comparative
responsibility is that a single injury is more or less unitary." Id. § I cmt. a.
35. 96 N.M. at 682, 634 P.2d at 1234.
36. Id. at 690, 634 P.2d at 1242.
37. Id. at 688, 634 P.2d at 1240.
38. Id.
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Foreshadowing the adoption of several liability, the Scott court stated that in
multiple party cases, the factfinder "will address the question of liability between
each plaintiff and each defendant, to reflect such apportionment., 39 This oblique
reference to several liability in a comparative negligence case limiting its holding
to negligence-related causes of actions suggested that the scope of the doctrine of
several liability similarly would be confined to claims for negligence and
negligence-related causes of action.
In Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc.,4 the court of appeals ruled that
the logic of Scott compelled not only that comparative fault take the place of
contributory negligence, but also that several liability of multiple defendants
supersede the doctrine of joint and several liability among multiple tortfeasors.
Judge Wood implicitly acknowledged that the limits set in Scott for the adoption of
comparative negligence would also apply to the doctrine of several liability when
he framed the appellate issue to be whether several liability should apply "in a
comparative negligence case"'" and found no reason to retain joint and several
liability "in our pure comparative negligence system. ,42 The common law of several
liability thus set the limit of the doctrine's application at negligence and negligence-
based causes of action, equating the scope of several liability with the scope of the
comparative negligence doctrine from which it sprang.43
The Several Liability Act incorporates the Scott/Bartlett approach of limiting
several liability to particular causes of action. The Act declares that the doctrine of
several liability applies to "any cause of action to which the doctrine of comparative
fault applies," unless the statute provides an exception.' In this context,
"comparative fault" is the affirmative defense that reduces the defendant's liability
by the percentage of fault attributable to the plaintiff-the doctrine created in
Scott.45 Unless a provision of the Several Liability Act provides otherwise, several
liability applies to any cause of action to which the partial affirmative defense of
comparative negligence applies to plaintiff's cause of action.
The controlling issue, then, is determining to which of a plaintiffs causes of
action the doctrine of comparative fault provides a partial affirmative defense. Often
this will be simple to ascertain. Where contributory negligence was once a defense,
Scott substituted comparative negligence and the Several Liability Act imposes
39. Id.
40. 98 N.M. at 152, 646 P.2d at 579.
41. Id. at 154, 646 P.2d at 581.
42. Id. at 159, 646 P.2d at 586.
43. Though the outer limits of several liability were the outer limits of comparative negligence, Judge Wood
indicated that in certain kinds of negligence cases the doctrine of several liability might not apply even if the
comparative negligence doctrine did apply, He confined the adoption of several liability to "concurrent tortfeasors."
Id. at 159, 646 P.2d at 586. This resulted in the exclusion of the doctrine from cases involving "successive"
tortfeasors, see Lujan v. Healthsouth Rehab. Corp., 120 N.M. 422, 902 P.2d 1025 (1995), and has led to creation
of a distinct set of rules applicable to actions involving successive tortfeasors. See infra notes 209-22, 231-33, and
accompanying text; Lewis v. Samson, 131 N.M. 317, 35 P.3d 972 (2001).
44. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-l(A) (Michie 1996).
45. Andrew Schultz & Mario E. Occhialino, Statutory Adoption of Several Liability in New Mexico: A
Commentary and Quasi-Legislative History, 18 N.M. L. REV. 483, 487 (1988).
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several liability. Thus, in a negligence case, the doctrine of comparative negligence
applies46 and the Several Liability Act also applies.47
On occasion, determining whether contributory or comparative negligence is a
defense to a cause of action will be complicated for one of two reasons. First, New
Mexico precedent may not have resolved whether the former doctrine of
contributory negligence was a defense to a particular cause of action. 8 Second, it
is possible that New Mexico precedent, influenced by the harshness of the common
law doctrine of contributory negligence, formerly may have ruled the defense
inapplicable,49 but courts might now overrule the decision based on the ameliorating
effect of the doctrine of comparative negligence. The supreme court in Scott
suggested that such common law exemptions from the defense of contributory
negligence may not apply after the adoption of comparative negligence.50
Strict Products Liability Claims
New Mexico has long applied the doctrine of strict products liability contained
in Section 402A of the Second Restatement."' Drafted when contributory negligence
was a complete defense, the Second Restatement provides that the most common
form of contributory negligence-failure of the plaintiff to discover the defect-is
not a defense to an action under Section 402A,52 though voluntarily and
unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known risk (i.e., assumption of risk) is a
defense.53 New Mexico initially adopted the Second Restatement position, ruling that
ordinary contributory negligence was not a defense to a strict products liability
action.54 Thus, prior to the adoption of comparative negligence, only unreasonable
assumption of risk barred the plaintiff from recovery.
46. Scott, 96 N.M. at 682, 634 P.2d at 1234.
47. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-I(A) (Michie 1996); Reichert v. Atler, 117 N.M. 623,624-25,875 P.2d 379,
380-81 (1994) ("Because the doctrine of comparative negligence applied, the Court of Appeals also held, relying
on Bartlett.. .that the Atlers should not be jointly and severally liable for the damages.... We agree...").
48. For example, no New Mexico case has decided whether contributory negligence was a defense to a cause
of action alleging nuisance based on defendant engaging in an ultrahazardous activity. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 840B(3) (1979) ("Some forms of contributory negligence constitute a defense to a nuisance action based
on ultrahazardous activity by defendant.").
49. See, e.g., Lester v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 275 F.2d 42, 43 (10th Cir. 1960) ("The law
of New Mexico recognizes.. that a defendant's negligent act may be committed under such aggravated
circumstances as to deny to defendant the right to interpose plaintiff's contributory negligence as a defense.");
Werner v. City of Albuquerque, 89 N.M. 272, 274, 550 P.2d 284, 296 (1976) ("Contributory negligence not
available as defense to statutory cause of action 'where the effect of the statute, ordinance or regulation is to place
the entire responsibility upon the defendant for plaintiffs injury."').
50. Scott, 96 N.M. at 687, 634 P.2d at 1239 ("Under comparative negligence, rules designed to ameliorate
the harshness of the contributory negligence rule are no longer needed.").
51. Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730,497 P.2d 732 (1972) (adopting of RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OFTORTS
§ 402A as law of New Mexico).
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n (1965).
53. Id.
54. Rudisaile v. Hawk Aviation, Inc., 92 N.M. 575, 577, 592 P.2d 175, 177 (1979) ("Conventional
contributory negligence is not an affirmative defense to strict liability... The existence of due care on the part of
the consumer is irrelevant."). The Restatement's exception for conduct involving the unreasonable decision to
encounter a known risk had been earlier acknowledged as a complete defense in a product liability action in New
Mexico. Bendorf v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 88 N.M. 355, 359, 540 P.2d 835, 839 (Ct. App. 1975),
cert. denied, 88 N.M.319, 540 P.2d 249.
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In Scott, the supreme court declined to decide whether the substitution of the
more benign doctrine of comparative fault in negligence actions would lead to
reversal of the decision not to take into account plaintiff s conventional negligence
in a products liability case. Thereafter, the court of appeals concluded that the
adoption of comparative negligence justified a reversal of the prior doctrine barring
conventional contributory negligence as a defense and held that "plaintiffs
negligence is a partial defense to a products liability claim in that the percentage of
plaintiff s fault, due to negligence, reduces the amount of the damages that plaintiff
may recover."56
Because comparative negligence now is a defense in a products liability action,
the Several Liability Act applies. 57 This does not mean, however, that those found
strictly liable for defective products will always be able to lay off fault on others.
While the Several Liability Act applies to strict products liability cases, the Act
contains an exception providing that in some situations a strictly-liable product
supplier will not be able to lay off fault on others.58 When multiple defendants are
strictly liable for the same product, such as where the manufacturer, the wholesaler,
and the retailer of a product are each joined as defendants and charged with strict
products liability, each of the defendants is liable without negligence and there is no
logical basis for comparing their relative negligence. 59 Recognizing this conceptual
problem, the drafters of the Several Liability Act concluded that where multiple
defendants are each liable for the sale of the same defective product, their liability,
when premised solely on strict lroducts liability, shall be joint and several rather
than several.6"
In addition to defendants in the chain of distribution, products liability cases may
involve additional tortfeasors who are charged with negligence rather than strict
products liability.6' In such cases, the principle remains the same but application of
55. Scott, 96 N.M. at 688, 634 P.2d at 1240. In dicta, the court suggested that it ultimately might rule that
ordinary negligence of the plaintiff would be recognized as a partial defense. Id.
56. Marchese v. Warner Communications, Inc., 100 N.M. 313, 317,670 P.2d 113, 117 (Ct. App. 1983), cert.
denied, 100 N.M. 259, 669 P.2d 735. See also Jaramillo v. Fisher Controls Co., Inc., 102 N.M. 614, 625-26, 698
P.2d 887, 898-99 (Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied, 102 N.M. 613, 698 P.2d 886; N.M. U.J.I. CIV. 13-1426.
In addition, the abolition of the doctrine of assumption of risk and the incorporation of its core into con-
tributory negligence has resulted, in products liability cases as in all others, in the application of comparative negli-
gence principles where formerly assumption of risk was a complete defense. Williamson v. Smith, 83 N.M. 336,
491 P.2d 1147 (1971). The Williamson court divided assumption of risk into two parts, primary and secondary. Id.
at 340, 491 P.2d at 1151. Primary assumption of risk was incorporated into the law of duty and breach of duty and
thus can continue to be a complete bar to recovery. See, e.g., Thompson v. Ruidoso-Sunland, Inc., 105 N.M. 487,
734 P.2d 267 (Ct. App. 1987). In contrast, "[a]ssumption of risk in its secondary sense is in reality nothing more
than contributory negligence," Williamson, 83 N.M. at 340,491 P.2d at 1151, and is now a part of the comparative
negligence doctrine. See, e.g., Yardman v. San Juan Downs, Inc., 120 N.M. 751, 906 P.2d 742 (Ct. App. 1995).
57. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-l(A) (Michie 1996).
58. Id. § 41-3A-1(C)(3).
59. But see Scott, 96 N.M. at 688, 634 P.2d at 1240 (suggesting that "under a comparative causation analysis
some courts" have "logically" applied comparative fault to strict liability, focusing "upon the part played by
plaintiffs 'misconduct' (rather than upon his negligence) which contributed to the injury"). The problem with this
suggestion is that it explains how to account for the plaintiff's misconduct but not how to evaluate the non-faulty
conduct of the manufacturer or distributor.
60. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A- 1 (C)(3) (Michie 1996). See also Schultz & Occhialino, supra note 45, at 492.
61. See, e.g., Jaramillo, 102 N.M. at 614, 698 P.2d at 887 (involving claims against the manufacturer and
the retailer of a propane tank for strict product liability because of a defective component of the propane tank and
against the company that filled the tank with propane only for negligence).
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the principle will change. For example, a manufacturer and retailer may be sued for
strict products liability along with an independent repairer of the product. Under
existing law, the latter is not liable under a theory of strict liability but only for
negligence.62 In such a case, the manufacturer and retailer will not be liable for the
percentage of fault attributable to the repairer but will be jointly and severally liable
only for the percentage of the responsibility attributable to their strict products
liability.6
3
More complex is the proper allocation of responsibility when the plaintiff sues
defendants in the chain of distribution, pleading and proving both strict products
liability and negligence. The factfinder will allocate fault for the negligence claims
but the Several Liability Act provides for joint and several liability for the strict
products liability claim.64 New Mexico law provides no answer to the question of
which cause of action will control the entry of judgment. The explicit statutory
mandate of joint and several liability should apply, thus making the defendants
jointly and severally liable.65 Yet it would seem inappropriate to ignore completely
the factfinder' s allocation of fault among the parties. Perhaps the best solution is to
impose joint and several liability based on their strict products liability while using
the factfinder's determination of comparative fault in the negligence claim to
determine the amount of contribution between the jointly and severally liable
tortfeasors.66
Intentional Torts
For two reasons, intentional tortfeasors do not get the benefit of several liability
and are fully liable for the harm their intentional wrongdoing proximately causes to
the plaintiff. First, contributory or comparative negligence is not a defense to an
intentional tort67 and thus the core triggering provision for several liability-that it
62. See, e.g., Martinez v. Gouveneur Gardens Housing Assoc., 184 A.D.2d 264,585 N.Y.S.2d 23 (App. Div.
1992); Rolph v. EBI Companies, 159 Wis.2d 518,464 N.W.2d 667 (1991); Jaramillo, 102 N.M. at 614, 698 P.2d
at 887.
63. See Schultz & Occhialino, supra note 45, at 492 ("The strictly liable marketers are treated as a single
unit whose collective culpability is compared to that of the negligent co-tortfeasors. Each strictly liable marketer
is jointly and severally liable for the percentage of culpability attributed to the marketing unit, but is not liable for
the percentage of fault attributed to the negligent co-tortfeasor.").
64. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-l(C)(3) (Michie 1996).
65. The Several Liability Act provides generally for several liability "except as otherwise provided
hereafter," Id. § 41-3A-I(A), and section (C) thereafter provides that "joint and several liability shall apply" to strict
product liability claims. Id. § 41-3A- I (C)(3).
66. As jointly and severally liable tortfeasors, the manufacturer and the marketers are subject to the Uniform
Contribution Act. Id. § 41-3-1. Normally, complete indemnity of the marketer by the manufacturer would be
appropriate if neither the manufacturer nor the marketer were guilty of negligence. In re Consolidated Vista Hills
Litigation, 119 N.M. 542, 546, 893 P.2d 438,442 (1995). Where, however, the marketer and manufacturer are each
actively negligent, contribution, rather than indemnity, will determine their rights between themselves, Id. at 549,
893 P.2d at 445, and the amount of contribution among tortfeasors is based on comparative degrees of fault, N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 41-3-2(D) (Michie 1996).
67. Reichert v. Atler, 117 N.M. 628, 633, 875 P.2d 384, 389 (Ct. App. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 117
N.M. 623, 875 P.2d 379 (1994) ("At common law, the defense of contributory negligence was not available where
the acts resulting in injury to a plaintiff were occasioned by the intentional misconduct of a defendant.");
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 481 (1965) ("The plaintiff's contributory negligence does not bar recovery
against a defendant for a harm caused by conduct of the defendant which is wrongful because it is intended to cause
harm to some legally protected interest of the plaintiff or a third person.").
(Vol. 33
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applies when the doctrine of comparative fault applies 6 --is absent. Second, the
Several Liability Act explicitly imposes joint and several liability upon wrongdoers
who act with the intent of inflicting injury.69 It is unlikely that the ameliorating
effect of the substitution of comparative for contributory negligence in New Mexico
will lead to a different result. In Reichert v. Atler,70 a case decided after the adoption
of comparative negligence, the supreme court affirmed that an intentional tortfeasor
is fully liable for harm the tortfeasor proximately causes.
The Third Restatement reaches the same result through similar reasoning.
Although the Restatement applies generally to all actions for personal injury
whatever the legal theory,7' a provision in the Restatement, similar to one in the
Several Liability Act,72 provides that any person who commits an intentional tort is
jointly and severally liable for the injury caused.73
The Third Restatement leaves some room for jurisdictions to modify the rule of
joint and several liability for intentional wrongdoing. A comment to the section
imposing joint and several liability for intentional wrongdoing suggests that there
may be cases in which the defendant is guilty of an intentional tort but his
culpability is "quite modest, for example a defendant who committed a battery based
on an unreasonable, yet honest, belief that the conduct was privileged."74 The
comment leaves to individual states the determination whether it is more appropriate
to apply several liability to the intentional tortfeasor in such cases.75 There is no
indication in New Mexico law that New Mexico will act on this suggestion, and the
language of the Several Liability Act leaves no room for creation of such an
76
exception.
Though the intentional tortfeasor is fully liable for all harm proximately caused,
tortfeasors whose negligence combined with the intentional tortfeasor's conduct to
cause the harm can lay off fault on the intentional tortfeasor. This is so even when
the plaintiff demonstrates that the negligent defendant's failure to protect the
plaintiff from the intentional tortfeasor allowed the intentional tortfeasor to injure
the plaintiff. In Reichert v. Atler,77 a bar patron was shot and killed by a fellow
patron when the bar owners negligently failed to protect the patron from the
assailant. The plaintiff argued that if the owners were able to lay off fault on the
intentional wrongdoer, the factfinder would surely attribute most of the fault to the
intentional wrongdoer, thus diminishing the landowner's incentive to protect the
plaintiff from the intentional wrongdoer.7' The supreme court rejected the trial
court's ruling imposing full liability on the bar owners. Instead, the court allowed
68. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-I(A) (Michie 1996).
69. Id. § 41-3A-1(C)(1).
70. 117 N.M. 623, 626, 875 P.2d 379, 382 (1994).
71. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 1 (2000).
72. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-I(C)(1) (Michie 1996).
73. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 12 (2000).
74. Id. § 12 cmt. b.
75. Id.
76. "The doctrine of joint and several liability shall apply... to any person or persons who acted with the
intention of inflicting injury or damage." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1(C) (Michie 1996).
77. 117 N.M. 623, 875 P.2d 379 (1994).
78. Id. at 626, 875 P.2d at 382.
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them to lay off fault on the assailant.79 Acknowledging that this might diminish the
incentive of the landowner to prevent intentional wrongs to visitors, the court
fashioned a special jury instruction designed to counteract the tendency of the
factfinder to place most blame on the intentional tortfeasor80
The Third Restatement reaches the opposite conclusion. Section 14 provides that
"[a] person who is liable to another based on a failure to protect the other from the
specific risk of an intentional tort is jointly and severally liable for the share of
comparative responsibility assigned to the intentional tortfeasor in addition to the
share... assigned to the person."'" The reasons for the Restatement's position are
interrelated: First, the factfinder may be persuaded to assign most of the fault to the
intentional wrongdoer; second, because intentional tortfeasors often are insolvent,
the injured person often would not receive compensation; and, third, allowing the
negligent person to lay off fault may diminish the person's incentive to take
precautions to prevent the intentional wrongdoing. 82 The Reichert court concluded
that the specially crafted jury instruction would suffice to prevent the factfinder from
laying off most fault on the intentional tortfeasor and thus would provide sufficient
incentive to the negligent tortfeasor to comply with its duty to protect the plaintiff
from the intentional tortfeasor. 83 The Restatement's concern for leaving the plaintiff
with an uncollectable judgment against impecunious intentional tortfeasors was not
addressed in Reichert and is unlikely to provide a rationale for the adoption of the
Restatement position in New Mexico. Bartlett itself left the plaintiff with an
uncollectable claim against an unknown tortfeasor8 Judge Wood was of the view
that "it seems startling to find that plaintiffs, as a class, have a greater claim upon
the court's sympathy than defendants '85 and rejected the argument that joint and
several liability should continue to exist in order to afford plaintiff a greater chance
of recovery when one tortfeasor is insolvent or unknown.86 If litigants are to make
inroads on the courts' current blanket rejection of joint and several liability in such
cases, they may attempt do so with public policy arguments similar to, but
necessarily more persuasive than, those that support Section 14 of the Third
Restatement.
87
79. Id. The arguments for and against this ruling were expansively articulated in the court of appeals opinion.
Reichert, 117 N.M. at 628, 875 P.2d at 384.
80. Id. at 626, 875 P.2d at 382. The core provision of the jury instruction is that "the proportionate fault of
the [owner] [occupant] is not necessarily reduced by the increasingly wrongful conduct of the third person." N.M.
UJI. Civ. 13-1320.
81. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 14 (2000). A comment notes that
the provision purposely does not impose joint and several liability on a person who breaches a duty to protect a
person from harm negligently inflicted, although it leaves open the door for such a ruling if compelling reasons exist
for doing so. Id. cmt. b.
82. Id. § 14 cmt. b.
83. Reichert, 117 N.M. at 626, 875 P.2d at 382.
84. Bartlett, 98 N.M. at 152, 646 P.2d at 579.
85. Id. at 158, 648 P.2d at 585 (quoting with approval from Erwin E. Adler, Allocation of Responsibility after
American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court, 6 PEPP. L. REV. 1 (1978)).
86. Id.
87. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-I(C)(4) (Michie 1996) (When there is proof of a "sound basis in public
policy" for doing so, a court may impose joint and several liability.); see infra notes 305-60 and accompanying text.
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Negligent Misrepresentation
One might expect that the comparative negligence defense would apply in an
action for negligent misrepresentation, but New Mexico law is to the contrary. In
Neff v. Bud Lewis Co.,88 the court of appeals rejected the application of the defense
of contributory negligence to a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation. As
an element of the cause of action, plaintiff must prove that he justifiably relied upon
the defendant's misrepresentation.89 Though the issue of justifiable reliance raises
an issue similar to contributory negligence, the court determined that this issue
"does not speak in terms of contributory negligence as a defense"90 and held that
"[t]he doctrine of negligent misrepresentation did not afford the defendants a
defense of contributory negligence." 9' If contributory negligence is irrelevant to a
claim for negligent misrepresentation, the Several Liability Act does not impose
several liability.92
National law tends to the contrary. Section 552A of the Second Restatement
provides that in an action for pecuniary loss due to negligent misrepresentation, "the
action is founded solely upon negligence, and the ordinary rules as to negligence
liability apply. '93 Moreover, the majority view is that the defense of comparative
negligence is available in negligent misrepresentation cases. 94 In accordance with
its focus on the type of injury suffered rather than the cause of action asserted, the
Third Restatement includes within its scope misrepresentation cases that involve
personal injury or physical damage to tangible property95 but excludes those
involving other types of injuries.96
Under existing New Mexico law set forth in Neff,97 a defendant guilty of
negligent misrepresentation will be fully liable and cannot lay off fault on other
tortfeasors. However, a means exists to bring negligent misrepresentation cases
within the Several Liability Act. The requirement that plaintiff must demonstrate
that he justifiably relied upon the misrepresentation is obviously similar to a
statement that if the plaintiff lacked reasonable care in evaluating the representation
the plaintiff cannot recover. If framed in the latter form, as an affirmative defense
of contributory negligence, the defense would then be transformed from
contributory negligence to comparative negligence as a result of the adoption of
comparative negligence in Scott.
98
Given the "'ameloriative principles of comparative negligence'... which strongly
favor letting a jury determine the relative accountability of our citizens for an
88. 89 N.M. 145, 148, 548 P.2d 107, 110 (Ct. App. 1976).
89. Id. at 148-49; 548 P.2d at 110-11; First Interstate Bank of Gallup v. Foutz, 107 N.M. 749, 764 P.2d 1307
(1988).
90. Neff, 89 N.M. at 148, 548 P.2d at 110.
91. Id. at 149, 548 P.2d at 111.
92. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-l(A) (Michie 1996).
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552A (1977).
94. See Sonja Larsen, Annotation, Applicability of Comparative Negligence Doctrine to Actions Based on
Negligent Misrepresentation, 22 A.L.R. 5th 464, 471 (1994).
95. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 1 cmt. b (2000).
96. Id. § 1 cmt. e. The comment notes that a jurisdiction might want to refer to the Restatement by analogy
where the Restatement is not directly applicable. Id.
97. 89 N.M. at 145, 548 P.2d at 107.
98. Scott, 96 N.M. at 682, 634 P.2d at 1234.
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injury,"99 it might be appropriate to transform "justifiable reliance" from an all-or-
nothing element of plaintiffs prima facie case to the affirmative defense of
comparative negligence. The New Mexico Supreme Court acted similarly in dealing
with the "open and obvious danger" rule that barred recovery of persons who
encountered negligently created but "open and obvious dangers" on land. Under
former law, a landowner owed no duty to a visitor to warn or fix an open and
obvious danger on the land."° In Klopp v. Wackenhut Corp.,"0 ' the New Mexico
Supreme Court determined the issue was more properly framed as whether the
danger was unreasonable and whether the landowner should reasonably anticipate
that a visitor would not discover or realize the danger. 02 The plaintiff successfully
argued that the open and obvious danger bar to recovery was in reality equivalent
to applying the complete defense of contributory negligence to bar her recovery, a
result that was incompatible with the doctrine of comparative negligence.'03 The
court agreed to eliminate this total bar, following cases from other jurisdictions that
did so "in light of adoption of comparative negligence."'" In similar fashion, the
current requirement that plaintiff prove justifiable reliance as an element of a
negligent misrepresentation case may be incompatible with comparative negligence
principles and perhaps should be transformed from an element of plaintiff s case to
the affirmative defense of comparative negligence. The Several Liability Act and the
doctrine of several liability would then apply to claims for negligent misrepresenta-
tion. "'
Fraud
Persons guilty of fraud will continue to be jointly and severally liable despite the
passage of the Several Liability Act. Because plaintiff's negligence is not a defense
to a fraud action,0 6 the statute imposing several liability where comparative fault is
a defense is not applicable. 7 Moreover, fraud is an intentional tort... and the
Several Liability Act provides that joint and several liability applies to persons who
act with the intent to cause harm."° In Otero v. Jordon Restaurant Enterprises,' °
decided well after the adoption of comparative negligence and the passage of the
99. Yount v. Johnson, 121 N.M. 585, 586, 915 P.2d 341, 342 (Ct. App. 1996).
100. Klopp v. Wackenhut Corp.. 113 N.M. 153, 155, 824 P.2d 293, 295 (1992) (quoting N.M. U.J.I. Civ. 13-
1310 (now superseded)).
101. 113 N.M. 153, 824 P.2d 293 (1992).
102. Id. at 158, 824 P.2d at 298.
103. Id. at 156, 824 P.2d at 296.
104. Id. at 158, 824 P.2d at 298.
105. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-I(A) (Michie 1996).
106. Fortier v. Dona Anna Plaza Partners, 747 F.2d 1324, 1337 (10th Cir. 1984) (interpreting N.M. law)
("[C]ontributory negligence has no place in.. .fraud actions.").
107. Several liability applies in "any cause of action to which the doctrine of comparative fault applies." N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-I(A) (Michie 1996).
108. Fraud requires a misrepresentation of fact "made with the intent to deceive." Otero v. Jordon Rest.
Enters., 122 N.M. 187, 192, 922 P.2d 569, 574 (1996).
109. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1(C)(1) (Michie 1996).
110. 122 N.M. at 187, 922 P.2d at 569.
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Several Liability Act, the supreme court explicitly ruled that a defendant guilty of
fraud could not lay off fault on other tortfeasors.l'
Nuisance
An action for nuisance can be premised upon negligence, intentional wrongdoing,
or liability for ultra-hazardous activities in the absence of fault. "2 When the plaintiff
relies upon negligent conduct of the defendant to prove nuisance, the defense of
contributory negligence historically has applied. 13 The Second Restatement provides
that the doctrine of contributory negligence applies to negligence-based nuisance
cases "to the same extent as in other actions founded on negligence."'"' With the
widespread substitution of comparative fault for contributory negligence, most
jurisdictions substitute comparative negligence for the former defense of
contributory negligence in nuisance actions founded on negligence.' A California
court explained that "there is no reason to allow negligent plaintiffs to sue on a
simple allegation of nuisance in order to avoid the consequences of their
comparative fault" if the nuisance is premised on negligence. 116
In a pre-comparative negligence case, the New Mexico Supreme Court suggested
that "where nuisance results from negligence.. .the defense of contributory
negligence is [a] good defense to such nuisance action.""..7 This is consistent with
national law"'and New Mexico almost certainly will conclude that comparative
negligence, substituting for contributory negligence, is now a defense to a
negligence-based nuisance action.'' 9 If so, the Several Liability Act dictates the
application of several liability to defendants found liable for negligence-based
nuisance actions.1
20
New Mexico has had no occasion to determine whether plaintiffs negligence is
a defense when a nuisance action is based on intentional wrongdoing. The Second
Restatement states that when nuisance is based on intentional misconduct,
121
contributory negligence is not a defense. 22 Because New Mexico does not apply the
111. Id. at 192, 922 P.2d at 574.
112. Moreno v. Marrs, 102 N.M. 373, 379, 695 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Ct. App. 1985), cert. quashed sub non.
Corral Inc. v. Marris, 102 N.M. 412, 696 P.2 1005 (1985) (quoting with approval PROSSER, THE LAW OFTORTS 577
(4th ed. 1971)). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979).
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840B (1979).
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., Tint v. Sanborn, 259 Cal. Rptr. 902 (Ct. App. 1989); First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman,
702 N.E.2d 1002 (1998), rev'd on other grounds, 720 N.E.2d 1068 (1999).
116. Tint, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 907.
117. Seiler v. City of Albuquerque, 57 N.M. 467, 471, 260 P.2d 375, 377-78 (1953).
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840B (1979).
119. Scott, 96 N.M. at 690, 634 P.2d at 1242 (noting that "a pure comparative negligence standard shall
supersede prior law [of contributory negligence]").
120. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-l(A) (Michie 1996). If it is possible to allocate responsibility among the
multiple wrongdoers based on their causal contribution to the nuisance, liability will be apportioned in accordance
with the relative causal contributions rather than in accordance with their comparative fault. Id. § 41-3A-1(D). See
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A cmt. d (1965).
121. The definition of "intentional" for this purpose requires a finding that the defendant's interference with
the plaintiff's rights be done "for the purpose of causing it," or that the resulting injury is "substantially certain to
result" from the defendant's conduct. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 825 (1979).
122. Id. §§ 840B-840C (1979).
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doctrine of comparative negligence to intentional torts,'23 it is probable that a
defendant liable for intentional nuisance will not be able to lay off fault on other
tortfeasors. '24 This likely result is buttressed by the provision in the Several Liability
Act that preserves joint and several liability for intentional wrongdoing.'25
When nuisance is premised upon a defendant engaging in an ultra-hazardous or
abnormally dangerous activity, the Second Restatement provides that only the form
of contributory negligence that constitutes a voluntary and unreasonable decision
by plaintiff to encounter the risk is a defense. '26 No New Mexico case deals with the
applicability of the defense of contributory or comparative negligence in such cases.
The Second Restatement's limitation of the defense to this one form of negligence,
however, is the same as that contained in Section 402A of the Second Restatement
dealing with defenses to strict product liability. 127 In Marchese v. Warner
Communications, Inc., 28 the court of appeals ruled that the adoption of comparative
negligence called for the extension of the defense of comparative negligence beyond
unreasonable assumption of risk to all forms of comparative negligence.'29 By a
parity of reasoning, comparative negligence in all its forms may be a partial defense
to a nuisance action based on ultra-hazardous or abnormally dangerous activity. 30
Whether the limited form of contributory negligence or the full spectrum of
contributory negligence applies, Scott transformed the defense to comparative
negligence and the Several Liability Act therefore allows defendants in such cases
to lay off fault on other wrongdoers.' 3
Breach of Contract Actions
It is not necessary for a plaintiff to prove fault to succeed in a breach of contract
action.'32 Nor is contributory negligence or comparative negligence of the plaintiff
123. Reichert, 117 N.M. at 633, 875 P.2d at 389.
124. Several liability applies only to a "cause of action to which the doctrine of comparative fault applies."
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-I(A) (Michie 1996). See also Fletcher v. City of Independence, 708 S.W.2d 158, 169
n.2 (Mo. App. W.D. 1986) (noting that comparative fault defense is inapplicable to action for intentional nuisance).
125. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-I(C)(1) (Michie 1996).
126. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840B(3) (1979).
127. Id. § 402A cmt. n ("[Tihe form of contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily and
unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk,
is a defense under this Section as in other cases of strict liability.").
128. 100 N.M. 313, 670 P.2d 113 (Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 100 N.M. 259, 669 P.2d 735.
129. Id. at 319, 670 P.2d at 119. The court relied in part on supreme court dicta in Scott v. Rizzo that suggested
that the adoption of comparative negligence would probably result in the application of comparative fault principles
for all forms of fault, despite the language of Section 402A, comment n, limiting the defense. See Scott, 96 N.M.
at 688, 634 P.2d at 1240.
130. Possibly the two doctrines should not be equated. Some commentators are of the view that it is not true
"that the policies behind strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities are the same as those relied on by courts
moving to strict products liability," Dix W. Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and
Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REV. 93, 116 (1972), but are significantly different. A Reappraisal of Contributory
Fault in Strict Products Liability Law, 2 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 235 (1976).
131. The Act imposes several liability in all actions in which comparative fault applies. N.M. STAT. ANN. §
41-3A-I(A) (Michie 1996).
132. Paiz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 118 N.M. 203, 212, 880 P.2d 300, 309 (1994) ("[C]ontract law is,
in its essential design, a law of strict liability, and the accompanying system of remedies operates without regard
to fault." (quoting ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.8 (3d ed. 1990)).
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a defense to a contract action.' 33 As a result, actions for breach of contract are
outside the scope of the Several Liability Act.'34 Persons liable for breach of
contract, therefore, are jointly and severally liable for harm caused by their breaches
and may not use the Several Liability Act to lay off fault on others, whether the
others also breached contracts or are tortfeasors.
The application of joint and several liability to contract breachers could be harsh.
Not only is the contract breacher liable for all of plaintiff's compensable harm, but
the breacher has no mechanism to seek contribution from other wrongdoers who
contributed to the plaintiff's injuries. The statute allowing contribution applies only
to joint tortfeasors'35 and the common law doctrine of complete indemnity, though
available to persons liable for breach of contract,'36 is of limited scope. 137 To remedy
this perceived deficiency in the law, the supreme court has created a
doctrine-proportional indemnification--that allows persons fully liable for breach
of contract to thereafter recover from others whose conduct contributed to the
plaintiff's injury. 138 The amount of recovery is based upon the percentage of fault
attributable to the other persons. 139 The doctrine does not modify the rule imposing
joint and several liability for breach of contract, but it serves as a mechanism for a
fully liable contract breacher who pays the judgment to thereafter seek partial
indemnification from other culpable persons.In
133. Allsup's Convenience Stores, Inc. v. N. River Ins. Co., 1999-NMSC-006, 23,976 P.2d 1, 11; Bowlin's
v. Ramsey Oil Co., 99 N.M. 660, 672, 662 P.2d 661,673 (Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 644, 662 P.2d 645
("[C]omparative liability is not part of the Uniform Commercial Code.").
134. Allsup's Convenience Stores, 1999-NMSC-006, 23, 976 P.2d at 11 ("Because the doctrine of
comparative fault does not apply to contract actions, the Several Liability Act does not apply to breach of contract
actions.").
135.. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-2 (Michie 1996).
136. In re Consolidated Vista Hills Retaining Wall Litigation, 119 N.M. 542, 551, 893 P.2d 438,447 (1995).
137. Id. at 546, 893 P.2d at 442 ("[T]he right to indemnification involves whether the conduct of the party
seeking indemnification was passive and not active or in pari delicto."). See also id. at 546-47, 893 P.2d at 442-43
(describing the terms "active," "passive" and "in pari delicto").
138. Id. at 552, 893 P.2d at 448 ("[T]o establish an equitable system in which a defendant who cannot raise
the fault of a concurrent tortfeasor as a defense because of the plaintiffs choice of remedy, we adopt the doctrine
of proportional indemnification under which a defendant who is otherwise denied apportionment of fault may seek
partial recovery from another at fault.").
139. Id. at 553, 893 P.2d at 449 ("[I]f Shollenbarger's alleged negligence caused Amrep to breach its contract
with the homeowners, Amrep should be able to seek proportional indemnification for that percentage of fault
attributable to Shollenbarger."). Although it is not necessary that fault be proven to establish a breach of contract,
there will be situations when the contract breacher is demonstrably guilty of fault and the third person's percentage
of responsibility will be determined by comparing his fault with that of the contract breacher. Where the contract
breacher is guilty of no fault, the third person's fault will be 100 percent of the fault as between the third person and
the no-fault contract breacher. This may result in practice in full indemnification from the third person to the
contract breacher. If there are several negligent third persons, the proportional indemnification will depend upon
the relative fault of each, and that of the contract breacher, if any. It is not clear how proportional indemnification
will work if the contract breacher is guilty of no fault and the third person is also a no-fault contract breacher.
Comparing fault when no one is guilty of fault is not possible. Perhaps in such cases the proportions should be
"equal shares" as the contribution statute once provided, Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. W. Farm Bureau
Ins. Cos., 93 N.M 507, 508, 601 P.2d 1203, 1204 (1979), before the statutory adoption of comparative contribution
in 1987. Act of Apr. 7, 1987, ch. 141, § 3(D), 1987 N.M. Laws 852, 854 (codified in N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-2(D)
(Michie 1996)).
140. In re Consolidated Vista Hills, 119 N.M. at 552, 893 P.2d at 448-49 ("[W]e... modify the common-law
right to indemnification when an indemnitee has been adjudged liable for full damages on a third-party claim that
was not susceptible under law to proration of fault among concurrent tortfeasors. Such proportional indemnification
applies only when contribution or some other form of proration of fault among tortfeasors is not available.").
Winter 2003]
NEW MEXICO LA W REVIEW
When provided the choice of suing for negligence or breach of contract,
therefore, it is to the advantage of a plaintiff to frame the action as one for breach
of contract. The contract breacher is fully liable for the harm to the plaintiff, and the
breacher, rather than the plaintiff, bears the burden of suing others and the risk that
they will lack the resources to reimburse the contract breacher for proportional
indemnification.
A claim for breach of contractual warranties also may benefit a plaintiff more
than a strict product liability cause of action. The Several Liability Act provision
imposing joint and several liability in strict product liability actions applies only to
the portion of liability attributable to those in the chain of distribution.14' The Act
does not impose joint and several liability on product sellers for all damages when
those in the chain of distribution can demonstrate that another tortfeasor's
negligence contributed to the plaintiffs injuries. 142 Thus, if the manufacturer and
wholesaler are sued for strict product liability for defective brakes in the vehicle sold
to plaintiff, those defendants can lay off fault upon the driver of another vehicle
whose negligence combined with the defective brakes to cause an accident and
injuries to the plaintiff. The manufacturer and wholesaler are jointly and severally
liable only for the percentage of fault attributable to their shared liability for strict
products liability. 143 By phrasing the claim against the manufacturer and wholesaler
as one for breach of warranty, plaintiff can avoid existing New Mexico law that
allows the manufacturer and wholesaler to lay off fault on the other tortfeasor.
Manufacturers liable for breach of contract are fully liable for all harm,'" though
they may later pursue proportional indemnification from the contributing negligent
tortfeasors.' 4
5
The Third Restatement position, rejecting a theory-by-theory approach to several
liability in favor of one that applies the Restatement to all legal theories,'46 here is
superior to the New Mexico approach. It is doubtful that sound policy reasons
justify the different results achieved by labeling a personal injury claim as one in
contract rather than tort. A claim for breach of warranty and a claim for strict
product liability are most often essentially the same. Merely characterizing the claim
as a contractual warranty action should not change the scope of liability of one
whose liability for personal injury can be stated as either a tort or a breach of
contract. The adoption of proportional indemnification in contract cases 147 provides
a step in that direction; however, that doctrine is not the same as several liability. It
does not reduce the liability of the contract breacher to the plaintiff as does several
liability but merely provides for a remedy similar to comparative contribution after
the contract breacher makes full payment to the plaintiff.141
141. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1(C)(3) (Michie 1996).
142. Schultz & Occhialino, supra note 45, at 492-93.
143. Id.
144. Allsup's, 1999-NMSC-006, 1 23, 976 P.2d at I I ("Because the doctrine of comparative fault does not
apply to contract actions, the Several Liability Act does not apply to breach of contract actions").
145. In re Consolidated Vista Hills, 119 N.M. at 552, 893 P.2d at 448.
146. The Restatement applies to all legal theories when the plaintiff seeks damages for personal injury or
injury to tangible property. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 1 (2000).
147. See, e.g., In re Consolidated Vista Hills, 119 N.M. at 552, 893 P.2d at 448.
148. Id. at 552-53, 893 P.2d at 448-49.
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The ideal solution might be to treat personal injury actions for breach of warranty
as essentially a strict product liability action, imposing the rules applicable to
defendants liable in tort for strict product liability upon defendants charged with
breach of warranty. New Mexico courts have already begun to limit the respective
spheres of tort and contractual warranty cases based on the type of harm suffered.
Strict tort liability is inapplicable to actions between contracting parties for
deficiencies in a product that cause harm only to the product itself.'49 It may be
equally appropriate to limit personal injury actions to tort theories that are more
finely attuned than are contract claims to the policies unique to actions involving
harm to persons. It is doubtful, however, that the courts alone can effectuate such
a change. The Uniform Commercial Code clearly authorizes recovery for personal
injuries in breach of warranty actions,150 and this statutory scheme might act as a
barrier to common law reform. Perhaps the judicial adoption of proportional
indemnification is the most that the judiciary can accomplish without the help of the
legislature. 151
Statutory Causes of Action
Most tort actions are based on common law theories, but the legislature has power
to create causes of action and to modify existing common law causes of action.
When this happens, the issue arises whether the statutory cause of action is subject
to the doctrine of several liability. If the legislation contains an explicit provision
addressing the several liability issue, there is no problem. Absent an explicit
statutory provision, the Several Liability Act provides the basis for resolving the
issue: If the defense of comparative negligence applies to the statutory cause of
action, the Several Liability Act applies to the cause of action.' 52 In only one statute,
dealing with liability of persons whose lack of reasonable care while excavating
causes harm to underground utilities, has the legislature specifically incorporated the
concept of comparative negligence into a statutory cause of action.'53
Where the legislature created the statutory cause of action prior to the adoption
of comparative negligence, a problem of construction might arise. If the statute
provides that contributory negligence is a defense, the court must determine whether
the legislature intended to enshrine contributory negligence as a complete defense
149. Utah Int'l v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 108 N.M. 539, 775 P.2d 741 (Ct. App. 1989). See also Spectron
Dev. Lab. v. Am. Hollow Boring Co., 1997-NMCA-025, 936 P.2d 852 (refusing to apply strict product liability not
only where the product itself was harmed but also, under the circumstances presented, where the defect caused harm
to other property of the plaintiff).
150. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-2-714(3) (Michie 1996) provides that in a proper case consequential damages
may be recovered for breach of warranty. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-2-715(2) (Michie 1996) defines consequential
damages as including "injury to person.. proximately resulting from any breach of warranty."
151. A court might construe the Uniform Commercial Code to be consistent with the abolition of warranty
actions for personal injuries caused by products. The Code authorizes consequential damages, including personal
injury damages, only "[i]n a proper case." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-2-714(3) (Michie 1996). Though no jurisdiction
has yet done so, a court might conclude that warranty actions for personal injury are not proper cases for the award
of consequential damages when the facts arguably fit within an existing cause of action for strict products liability.
152. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-l(A) (Michie 1996).
153. Id. § 62-14-6(A). The provision, added to the statute in 1987, see Act of Apr. 7, 1987, ch. 156, § 6, N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 62-14-6(A), while using the language of comparative fault, actually effectuates several liability by
providing that one wrongdoer only "may also be liable.. .for the comparative negligence of the person." Id.
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or was merely incorporating the then-applicable common law rule into the statute.
If the latter, the court then can rule that, the common law doctrine having changed,
the reference to contributory negligence should now be construed as incorporating
the doctrine of comparative negligence. This, in turn, will trigger the application of
the Several Liability Act to the statutory cause of action.'54
In adopting comparative negligence, the supreme court signaled that it would
likely construe statutory references to contributory negligence as susceptible to the
substitution of comparative negligence. In Scott v. Rizzo,'55 the opponents of
comparative negligence argued that the court could not adopt the doctrine because
the legislature had incorporated contributory negligence into several statutes that
could be changed only by the legislature.'56 The court disagreed, stating that
"legislative enactments designed to make the judge-made rule [of contributory
negligence] work...cannot be taken as legislative integration of the rule into
statutory law."' 57 The clear implication is that comparative negligence will substitute
for contributory negligence at least in statutes passed prior to the adoption of
comparative negligence.'58
One example is the Ski Safety Act,'59 which limits the duties owed by ski area
operators, imposes duties on skiers, and identifies the inherent risks of skiing
assumed by the skier. Passed in 1969160 and amended in 1979,"6' before the adoption
of comparative negligence, the Ski Safety Act does not explicitly state that
contributory negligence is a complete defense, but in effect it so provides. The Act
states that if the skier violates any of the duties imposed on the skier by the Act, the
skier "shall not be able to recover from the ski area operator for any losses or
damages where the violation of duty is causally related to the loss or damage
suffered.' ' 62 Despite this language barring recovery, the court of appeals in Lopez
v. Ski Apache Resort'63 construed the Act as authorizing comparative negligence as
a partial defense. The court found that "the doctrine of comparative negligence.. .is
154. Id.§41-3A-l(A).
155. 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981).
156. Opponents of comparative negligence argued that "the legislature has recognized the common-law rule
of contributory negligence as a part of the law.. because it has enacted certain statutes which were intended to mesh
with or provide exceptions to the traditional effect of a contributory negligence finding. Thus, they argue, the
legislature has integrated the doctrine into the statutory law of New Mexico." Scott, 96 N.M. at 686, 634 P.2d at
1238.
157. Id. at 687, 634 P.2d at 1239.
158. Among the statutes the Scott court considered were N.M. STAT. ANN. § 63-3-6 (Michie 1999)
(contributory negligence not a defense in action against railroad under specified circumstances) and N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 52-3-7 (Michie 1991) (in common law action by employee against employer who did not purchase Workers'
Compensation insurance, neither assumption of risk nor contributory negligence is a defense). Scott, 96 N.M. at 686,
n.6, 634 P.2d at 1238, n.6.
159. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-15-1-24-15-14 (Michie 2000).
160. Ski Safety Act, ch. 218, 1969 N.M. Laws 787.
161. Id. ch. 1, 1979 N.M. Laws 988.
162. N.M STAT. ANN. § 24-15-13 (Michie 2000).
163. 114 N.M. 202, 836 P.2d 648 (Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 113 N.M. 815, 833 P.2d 1181.
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not incompatible with the objectives or provisions of the Act."' 64 The court
buttressed its argument by referring to the supreme court's ruling in another case
that applied comparative negligence to actions under the Dram Shop Act.
165
Although the court did not address the issue of whether several liability would
apply, the Several Liability Act provides that it applies whenever, as in the Ski
Safety Act, the doctrine of comparative negligence applies. 1
66
Occasionally, pre-comparative negligence statutes sought to overcome the
harshness of the complete defense of contributory negligence by barring the defense.
For example, a New Mexico statute precludes a finding of contributory negligence
under some circumstances when the plaintiff is blind. 67 Statutes of this type,
designed to ameliorate the harshness of the complete bar of contributory negligence,
probably will not be construed as barring the application of comparative
negligence.
168
More often the statutory cause of action mentions neither several liability nor
contributory or comparative negligence. The Several Liability Act applies to such
statutes if the doctrine of comparative negligence is a partial defense to claims for
violation of the statute.'69 The New Mexico Dram Shop Act, 7 ' for example, deals
with claims against liquor licensees who serve alcohol to intoxicated customers who
thereafter cause injury to themselves or others.' The legislature promulgated the
statute in 1983, one year after the New Mexico courts first authorized a common law
cause of action against licensees. 172 Though passed after the adoption of comparative
negligence and the adoption of several liability, the Act and its subsequent
amendments mention neither. In Baxter v. Noce, 17 3 the supreme court nonetheless
concluded that when an intoxicated patron sues the licensee, the licensee may avail
164. Id. at 208, 836 P.2d at 654. Judge Apodaca's concurring opinion best details the reasons why the
application of comparative negligence is compatible with the act. Id. at 212-14, 836 P.2d at 658-60. Judge Bivins
agreed that comparative negligence was compatible with the Act, id. at 214, 836 P.2d at 660, but dissented on other
grounds.
165. Id. at 209, 836 P.2d at 655.
166. N.M STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-I(A) (Michie 1996).
167. Id. § 28-7-4 (Michie 2000). See also id. § 63-3-6 (Michie 1999) (contributory negligence not a defense
in action against railroad under specified circumstances); id. § 52-3-7 (Michie 1991) (noting that in common law
action by employee against employer who did not purchase Workers' Compensation insurance, neither assumption
of risk nor contributory negligence is a defense).
168. "Under comparative negligence, rules designed to ameliorate the harshness of the contributory
negligence rule are no longer needed," Scott, 96 N.M. at 687, 634 P.2d at 1239, and "legislative enactments
designed to.. ameliorate [contributory negligence's] harshness cannot be taken as legislative integration of the rule
into statutory law." Id.
169. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-I(A) (Michie 1996).
170. Id. § 41-11-1. The Act is not formally named "The Dram Shop Act," but the phrase is often used to
describe statutes allowing recovery of damages proximately resulting from the commercial sale of alcoholic
beverages by a tavernkeeper. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 509 (7th ed. 1999).
171. The supreme court has concluded that the Act did not supersede the common law cause of action first
recognized in Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 1269 (1982), but merely has modified it. In Baxter v. Noce,
107 N.M. 48, 752 P.2d 240 (1988), the court stated that the 1983 Dram Shop Act "did not create or abolish a cause
of action; instead it narrowed the liability of taverkeepers, exempted social hosts from liability, and set out the
elements which would constitute a breach of the duty established in Lopez." 107 N.M. at 50, 752 P.2d at 242.
172. Lopez, 98 N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 1269.
173. 107 N.M. 48, 752 P.2d 240.
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itself of the defense of comparative negligence. 74 In part the court reasoned that
comparative negligence applies to Dram Shop Act cases "because the action sounds
in negligence and because fault is the predicate for liability."' 75 Because comparative
negligence applies to a Dram Shop Act case, the Several Liability Act applies. 76 As
a result, a licensee sued for violation of the Dram Shop Act should be severally
liable and may lay off fault on other wrongdoers unless one of the four pockets of
joint and several liability set forth in the Several Liability Act 177 provides otherwise.
Successive Tortfeasors
The most intractable problem created by New Mexico's adoption of several
liability has been the integration of the successive tortfeasor doctrine into the fabric
of several liability. The issue usually arises when multiple tortfeasors cause harm
that might be capable of division into separate injuries caused by each tortfeasor.
This typically occurs when an initial tortfeasor causes harm to the victim who then
suffers additional harm because of medical malpractice during the treatment for the
initial harm,'7 8 or when a person who suffers injuries in a motor vehicle accident
alleges that a design defect in the motor vehicle caused additional injuries. ' There
are additional scenarios, having in common that a victim suffers an initial injury at
the hands of a tortfeasor and arguably suffers a causally-distinct second injury due
to the fault of another tortfeasor' 0 Scenarios analogous to those presented by
successive tortfeasors also might arise when there is only one tortfeasor.' 8
New Mexico courts have long distinguished between concurrent and successive
tortfeasors, though not in the context of several liability law. Prior to 1982, courts
174. In Baxter, the plaintiff was a passenger in the vehicle driven by the intoxicated driver. The plaintiff had
also been drinking to excess at the defendant's establishment. Defendant asserted the defense of "complicity which
bars recovery under a dramshop act to anyone who actively contributes to, procures, participates in or encourages
the intoxication of the inebriated driver." 107 N.M. at 50, 752 P.2d at 242. The court characterized complicity as
"only a hybrid form of contributory negligence" and ruled that the successor doctrine to contributory negligence,
comparative negligence, was thus a defense in dram shop cases in New Mexico. Id. at 51, 752 P.2d at 243.
The Dram Shop Act now permits the intoxicated patron-driver to sue for injuries he suffers but only if
the tavernkeeper is guilty of "gross negligence and reckless disregard for the safety" of the intoxicated patron. N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 41-1 I-I(B) (Michie 1996). The logic of the Baxter opinion almost certainly applies to permit the
partial defense of comparative negligence when the intoxicated driver sues for his own injuries under the statute.
175. Baxter, 107 N.M. at 52, 752 P.2d at 244. The court also reasoned that the statute did not actually create
a new cause of action but rather "merely limited [the] scope" of the pre-existing common law cause of action. Id.
176. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-I(A) (Michie 1996).
177. Id. § 41-3A-1(C); see infra notes 306-61 and accompanying text (concerning possible public policy
exception in these cases).
178. See, e.g., Lujan v. Healthsouth Rehab. Corp., 120 N.M. 422, 902 P.2d 1025 (1995); Lewis v. Samson,
2001-NMSC-035, 35 P.3d 972.
179. See, e.g., Norwest Bank of N.M., N.A. v. Chrysler Corp., 1999-NMCA-070, 981 P.2d 1215.
180. See, e.g., Lewis v. Samson, 1999-NMCA-145, 44, 992 P.2d 282, 292-93, rev'd on other grounds,
2001-NMSC-035, 35 P.3d 972 (discussing successive vehicle collisions).
181. The successive tortfeasor doctrine requires more than one tortfeasor. However, a related problem arises
when a person is initially injured through no one's fault or his own fault and is subsequently injured by the fault
of a tortfeasor. See Hebenstreit v. Athchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 65 N.M. 301, 336 P.2d 1057 (1959) (Plaintiff,
already suffering from disease, asserted that negligence of railroad enhanced the preexisting condition by
accelerating the progress of the disease.). Successive injury problems also may arise where the tortfeasor causing
the initial injury and the tortfeasor causing the enhanced injury are the same person. Couch v. Astec Indus., Inc.,
2002-NMCA-084, 34, 132 N.M. 631, 639, 53 P.3d 398, 406 ("We assume, but do not decide, that Defendant's
status as both the alleged original tortfeasor and the 'crashworthiness' tortfeasor does not preclude application of
the enhanced injury doctrine.").
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spoke of concurrent negligence as it related to contributory negligence, noting that
where the negligence of the plaintiff "continues up to the very moment of the injury
and is contemporaneous and concurrent with the negligence of the defendant," the
defense of contributory negligence barred the plaintiff from any recovery. 82 This
notion of contemporaneous acts of negligence as characteristic of concurrent
negligence was also applied in "last clear chance" cases in which courts concluded
that usually the last clear chance doctrine "cannot be invoked where there is
concurrent negligence, such as where the injured party's negligence continues up to
the very moment of the injury."'83 Concurrent negligence was contrasted with
situations where the negligence of plaintiff and defendant "are not actually
concurrent, but one succeeds the other by an appreciable interval."'' " These attempts
to distinguish concurrent from successive negligence based solely on whether one
followed the other in time later led to difficulty in distinguishing concurrent from
successive tortfeasors for purposes of determining the applicability of several
liability. 185
Few persons perceived the relevance of the distinction between concurrent and
successive tortfeasors when the court of appeals adopted several liability in
Bartlett. 186 One who apparently did was the author of the Bartlett opinion. Framing
the issue, Judge Wood limited the question presented to "whether a tortfeasor is
liable for all of the damage caused by concurrent tortfeasors under a theory of joint
and several liability."' 87 He also carefully cabined the court's holding adopting
several liability to cases in which the defendant is "a concurrent tortfeasor."' 188
Shortly after Bartlett, in Duran v. General Motors Corp.,189 the court of appeals
first explored the significance of the limitation of several liability to concurrent
negligence cases. The plaintiff was injured when the van in which she was a
passenger overturned. The plaintiff did not claim that defects in the van caused it to
overturn but asserted that manufacturing and design defects in the van caused all of
her injuries.' 90 Because plaintiff asserted that all of the injuries were caused by the
vehicle's defects, Duran did not present the issue of how to deal with successive,
separate injuries. Nonetheless, the court addressed the issue. The court noted that in
crashworthiness cases, the manufacturer is liable only for the additional injury
caused by the vehicle defect and not for any initial injuries that would have occurred
182. Thayer v. Denver & Rio Grande R.R. Co., 21 N.M. 330, 353, 154 P. 691, 697 (1916).
183. Bryan v. Phillips, 70 N.M. 1, 5, 369 P.2d 37, 39 (1962).
184. Lucero v. Harshey, 50 N.M. 1, 5, 165 P.2d 587, 589 (1946) (quoting with approval I THOMAS ATKINS
STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABLITY 126, 136 (1906)).
185. See, e.g., Lewis, 1999-NMCA- 145, 79,992 P.2d at 300 (Hartz, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
("[Tihe terms 'concurrent tortfeasors' and 'successive torfeasors'... suggest focusing on the temporal relationship
between separate causes of the plaintiff's injuries; such a focus can cause one to miss the real issue-whether the
jury has a basis for dividing the damages between two different causes or sets of causes.").
186. Bartlett, 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579.
187. Id. at 154, 646 P.2d at 581.
188. id. at 159, 646 P.2d at 586.
189. 101 N.M. 742, 688 P.2d 779 (Ct. App. 1983), cert. quashed, 101 N.M. 555, 685 P.2d 963 (1984),
overruled on other grounds by Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 120 N.M. 372, 902 P.2d 54 (1995).
190. The court of appeals reversed a jury verdict for the plaintiff because she failed to prove that any of her
injuries were caused by inadequate safety features. Id. at 753, 688 P.2d at 790. See also Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 890 F.2d 1540 (10th Cir. 1989) (finding all damages were caused by crashworthiness defect).
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anyway.'91 In such cases, the court ruled, "the concurrent tortfeasor concept is not
applicable."' 92 If the initial tortfeasor and the vehicle-defect tortfeasor are not
concurrent tortfeasors, the doctrine of several liability, limited as it was in Bartlett
to concurrent tortfeasors, would not apply.
The Duran court proposed a method of analysis for cases in which there may be
two injuries-the first caused by the initial collision and the enhanced injury caused
by defects in the vehicle. The plaintiff who seeks recovery for an enhanced injury
must prove'93 that the faulty design "caused injuries over and above those which
otherwise would have been sustained,"'194 must "demonstrate the degree of
'enhancement,"" 95 and must also prove "what injuries, if any, would have resulted
had the alternative, safer design been used."'196 These dicta played a significant role
in the resolution of later successive tortfeasor cases.
The court of appeals next discussed the successive tortfeasor doctrine in Martinez
v. First National Bank of Santa Fe.' Plaintiff was riding in the bed of Juan
Martinez's pickup truck when it overturned, causing plaintiff to suffer an injury that
was treated by Dr. Alkire. Plaintiff sued only Dr. Alkire, 98 alleging that his
negligent treatment caused additional injury. Dr. Alkire raised as affirmative
defenses that Martinez's negligent driving and plaintiff s negligent decision to ride
in the back of the truck should be compared to the fault of Dr. Alkire and should
reduce his liability. The plaintiff appealed the trial court's decision to allow Dr.
Alkire to lay off fault on Martinez.199 The court of appeals assumed that Martinez
and Dr. Alkire were successive rather than concurrent tortfeasors °° but found it
unnecessary to explore the liability of successive tortfeasors because the court of
appeals ruled that there was no proof that Martinez's negligence, if any, was a
proximate cause of the plaintiffs initial injuries.20' The court did suggest that if
Martinez were negligent and a proximate cause of the plaintiff's enhanced injuries
together with Dr. Alkire, Dr. Alkire could lay off fault on Martinez, thus reducing
Dr. Alkire's liability for the enhanced injury.22 This suggestion ultimately was
rejected by the supreme court.23
191. Id. at 750, 688 P.2d at 787.
192. Id.
193. Id. The court quoted with approval from Hebenstreit v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 65 N.M.
301, 336 P.2d 1057 (1959), which ruled that "the burden of proving with reasonable certainty the extent of the
aggravation was on the plaintiff." 65 N.M. at 306, 336 P.2d at 1061.
194. Duran, 101 N.M. at 749-50, 688 P.2d at 786-87.
195. Id. at 750, 688 P.2d at 787.
196. Id. The court borrowed much of its analysis from Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976).
197. 107 N.M. 268, 755 P.2d 606 (Ct. App. 1987), writ dismissed, 107 N.M. 308, 756 P.2d 1203 (1988),
overruled by Lujan v. Healthsouth Rehab. Corp., 120 N.M. 422, 902 P.2d 1025 (1995).
198. Dr. Alkire died before suit was filed. The action was brought against the estate of Dr. Alkire. 107 N.M.
at 269, 755 P.2d at 607.
199. Id.
200. The parties agreed that they were not concurrent tortfeasors, id. at 270, 755 P.2d at 608, and the court
treated the case as one involving successive tortfeasors. Id.
201. Id. at 271, 755 P.2d at 609.
202. 107 N.M. at 270, 755 P.2d at 608 ("[D]amages should be apportioned among those negligently
contributing to the (enhanced) injury if that negligence was a proximate cause of the injury.").
203. Lujan v. Healthsouth Rehab. Corp., 120 N.M. 422, 902 P.2d 1025 (1995).
(Vol. 33
JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
This slow progression in case law toward a resolution of the problem of
successive tortfeasors was interrupted by the passage of the Several Liability Act of
1985.2° The Act provides that in cases involving causally-distinct harms, "the fault
of each of the persons proximately causing one harm shall not be compared to the
fault of persons proximately causing other distinct harms. Each person is severally
liable only for the distinct harm which that person proximately caused."2 °5 The
drafters intended by this provision, contrary to the dicta in Martinez, that the doctor
should be fully liable for the distinct enhanced injury and thus could lay off fault
neither on another tortfeasor who caused the accident and initial injury nor on the
plaintiff whose negligence might have contributed to the accident and initial
injury.206
The supreme court first addressed the successive tortfeasor issue in 1995 in Lujan
v. Healthsouth Rehabilitation Corp.207 Lujan suffered a fractured femur, allegedly
due to the negligence of Jaramillo. After initial medical treatment, Lujan received
rehabilitation services from Healthsouth. During the rehabilitation, more than a
month after the initial injury, a Healthsouth employee allegedly enhanced the
original injury through negligent manipulation of the injured leg. Lujan initially
filed suit only against Jaramillo. That claim was settled and a release was entered
into between Lujan and Jaramillo. Lujan then sued Healthsouth for malpractice in
the treatment of the fracture. In resolving the issue of whether the release of
Jaramillo also released Healthsouth, the supreme court fully addressed the issue of
the relationship of several liability and successive tortfeasors.2 °'
The court first acknowledged that enhanced injury cases involve "successive
tortfeasors" in contrast to "concurrent tortfeasors."2 °9 Lujan established the core
rules of substantive liability applicable to cases involving an allegation that an initial
injury was followed by an enhanced injury due to negligent medical treatment of the
initial injury. The court determined the following:
" "Concurrent tortfeasors" exist "[w]hen the negligent acts or omissions of two or
more persons combine to produce a single injury., 210
" New Mexico has abolished joint and several liability for concurrent tortfeasors,
in favor of an apportionment of liability based upon comparative fault.2 '
" "Successive tortfeasors" are such "by reason of divisible and causally-distinct
injuries. '212 Thus, a tortfeasor is successive rather than concurrent when that
204. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-I(A) (Michie 1996).
205. Id. §41-3A-l(D).
206. Schultz & Occhialino, supra note 45, at 495. The drafters disagreed on the different issue of whether
the original tortfeasor should be liable for the enhanced injury as well as for the initial injury and intended that the
courts resolve the issue. Id. In Lujan, the supreme court ruled that where the original tortfeasor is determined to be
a proximate cause of the enhanced injury as well as the initial injury, the original tortfeasor is jointly and severally
liable with the successive tortfeasor for the enhanced injury. 120 N.M. 426-27, 902 P.2d 1029-30.
207. 120 N.M. at 422, 902 P.2d at 1025.
208. Surprisingly, the court ignored the obviously relevant Several Liability Act and instead resolved the issue
as a matter of common law.
209. 120 N.M. at 425-26, 902 P.2d at 1028-29.
210. Id. at 425,902 P.2d at 1028.
211. Id. at 425-26, 902 P.2d at 1028-29. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-l (Michie 1996).
212. Lujan, 120 N.M. at 426, 902 P.2d at 1029.
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tortfeasor's "separate causal contribution to plaintiff's harm can be measured." '213
The court noted that in determining whether tortfeasors are successive, some
courts find useful five other factors," 4 but the court rooted the distinction
between successive and concurrent tortfeasors not in those factors, but in the
requirement that "the original injury and the subsequent enhancement of that
injury are separate and causally-distinct injuries."2 5
" A successive tortfeasor is not liable for the entire harm to the plaintiff but only
for the additional, or enhanced, harm caused by the successive tortfeasor's
conduct. 2
16
• A successive tortfeasor is fully liable for the separate and causally-distinct injury
even if the original tortfeasor is also liable for the enhanced injury. 17
• The original tortfeasor is alone liable for the initial injury.218
• The original tortfeasor will be liable for the separate and causally-distinct
enhanced injury as well as the original injury if the negligence of the successive
tortfeasor was a foreseeable result of the original tortfeasor's conduct and the
successive tortfeasor's conduct does not break the natural and continuous
sequence of events required to find the original tortfeasor to be a proximate cause
of the enhanced injury.219
* When both the original tortfeasor and the successive tortfeasor are proximate
causes of the enhanced injury, their liability for the enhanced injury is joint and
several, rather than several. 2 0 The fault of the tortfeasor causing the original
injury is not compared to the fault of the successive tortfeasor who caused the
enhanced injury.221
" If the original tortfeasor satisfies the joint and several liability for the enhanced
injury, the original tortfeasor normally will have a right to full indemnity from the
successive tortfeasor.22
213. Id. at 427, 902 P.2d at 1030.
214. "In defining tortfeasors as successive rather than concurrent, courts have considered several other factors
that are relevant, including: I) the identity of time and place between the acts of alleged negligence; 2) the nature
of the cause of action brought against each defendant; 3) the similarity or differences in the evidence relevant to the
causes of action; 4) the nature of the duties allegedly breached by each defendant; and 5) the nature of the harm or
damages caused by each defendant." Id. at 426, 902 P.2d at 1029 (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 46 n.2 (4th ed. 1971)).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 427, 902 P.2d at 1030.
217. See id.
218. See id. at 426, 902 P.2d at 1029.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 427, 902 P.2d at 1030. The Third Restatement differs from this aspect of New Mexico law. Instead
of imposing joint and several liability on the tortfeasors whose fault combines to proximately cause the enhanced
injury, the Third Restatement provides that after the damages are divided into indivisible parts, "each individual part
is apportioned by responsibility," RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 26 cmt. a
(2000), with the result that the Third Restatement "apportions liability among persons causing any component part
according to that person's comparative share of responsibility." Id. at cmt. d. Though Lujan did not cite the Several
Liability Act in support of its conclusion that liability for the enhanced injury is joint and several, it was the intent
of the drafters of the Act that liability be joint and several for the enhanced injury. Schultz & Occhialino, supra note
45, at 495; see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-I(D) (Michie 1996). One judge on the New Mexico Court of Appeals
preferred the Third Restatement approach. See Lewis v. Samson, 1999-NMCA- 145, T9[ 92-97, 992 P.2d 282, 303-04
(Hartz, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), rev'd 2001-NMSC-035, 35 P.3d 972.
221. Lujan, 120 N.M. at 427, 902 P.2d at 1030.
222. Id.
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In Lewis v. Samson,2 23 another case involving original injuries allegedly enhanced
by medical malpractice by treating physicians, 224 the supreme court reviewed
Lujan's core principles and explored issues Lujan did not address. Griego stabbed
Lewis eight times. Dr. Samson and Dr. Ortiz treated Lewis's injuries, but Lewis
died. His personal representative sued Samson and Ortiz but not Griego. Plaintiff
asserted that the doctors were successive tortfeasors fully liable for the death of
Lewis because but for their negligence Lewis would not have died from his stab
wounds. 225 Plaintiff filed pre-trial motions seeking to prevent the doctors from
introducing trial evidence showing the fault of Griego. Plaintiff relied on Lujan's
ruling that the fault of the original tortfeasor was not to be compared to the fault of
the successive tortfeasor sued for causing an enhanced injury, here the death of
Lewis. The trial court refused to bar evidence of Griego's fault. At trial, the
defendants "generally presented a comparative-fault defense to the jury., 226 The trial
court instructed the jury to compare the fault of Griego and the doctors if the doctors
were negligent and caused harm to Lewis. The court entered judgment for the
defendants after the jury returned a special verdict finding that the defendants were
not negligent.
Plaintiff appealed, claiming that the trial court's erroneous ruling admitting
evidence of Griego's fault contaminated the jury's finding that the doctors were not
negligent. Plaintiff argued that Lujan had ruled that comparative fault of an initial
tortfeasor was not relevant to the issue of the liability of a successive tortfeasor for
a separate and causally-distinct injury.
The supreme court first addressed the issue of whether Lujan established as a
matter of law that doctors who negligently treat an injury caused by an initial
tortfeasor are always successive tortfeasors.227 The court concluded that Lujan did
not establish a legal principle making the doctors always successive tortfeasors.228
Whether treating doctors are successive tortfeasors depends in each case on whether
223. 2001-NMSC-035, 35 P.3d 972 [hereinafter Lewis (SC)].
224. In Lewis (SC), the supreme court explicitly limited its holding to cases involving subsequent medical
malpractice and disclaimed any intention "to examine in detail the distinction between concurrent and successive
tortfeasors. 2001-NMSC-035, 1 32 n.3, 35 P.3d at 984 n.3.
225. There is no indication in the opinions that plaintiff alleged in the alternative that if the doctors were not
successive tortfeasors they were nonetheless concurrent tortfeasors with Griego because their negligence combined
with Griego's tortious conduct to cause Lewis's death.
226. Lewis v. Sampson, 1999-NMCA-145, 1 16, 992 P.2d 282, 287 [hereinafter Lewis (CA)] (Apodaca, J.),
rev'd, 2001-NMSC-035, 131 N.M. 317, 35 P.3d 972. Defendants also may have tried to use evidence of Griego's
conduct to negate their causal connection to Lewis's death. For example, "Dr. Samson's counsel argued.. .that the
case was not a medical malpractice case but a case of cowardly back-stabbing murder."' Lewis (CA), 1999-NMCA-
145, 17, 992 P.2d at 287-288 (Apodaca, J.).
227. In the court of appeals, Judge Hartz, dissenting from Judge Apodaca's opinion for the court, perceived
the court as holding that in all cases of alleged medical malpractice in treatment of initial injuries, the doctors are
successive tortfeasors, a position with which Judge Hartz disagreed. Lewis (CA), 1999-NMCA-145, 1 74, 992 P.2d
at 298 (Hartz, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
228. Although the supreme court in Lujan did not determine that doctors were always successive tortfeasors,
the court did rule that the original tortfeasor always is liable as a matter of law for any enhanced injury caused by
a doctor's foreseeable negligence: So long as the enhanced injuries are not "so remote from the original injury as
to be unforeseeable," New Mexico "impose[s] as a 'positive rule of decisional law' the requirement of joint and
several liability upon the original tortfeasor for the original and enhanced injuries." Lewis (SC), 2001-NMSC-035,
33, 35 P.3d at 985.
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there is sufficient evidence to prove the required elements-an enhanced injury and
the degree of the enhancement.229
The court then considered the criteria to be used to determine whether there was
an enhanced injury and the degree of enhancement. The court of appeals had split
on the question of whether separate "injuries" or separate "damages" must be
proven.23° The supreme court ruled that it is an enhanced "injury" that must be
proven if successive tortfeasor treatment is to be accorded to the parties.23' This
ruling is consistent with prior supreme court precedent holding that in an action
alleging medical malpractice and seeking recovery for enhanced injuries,
"[u]ncertainty as to the amount of damages one may be entitled to receive will not
prevent a recovery.,
232
The supreme court also definitively set forth the proof required to establish that
tortfeasors are successive. The party who claims that the treating doctor is a
successive tortfeasor must prove
(1) that the successive tortfeasor's negligence resulted in injuries separate from
and in addition to the injuries which would have otherwise been caused by the
initial tort; and (2) the degree of enhancement caused by the medical treatment
by introducing evidence of the injuries that would have occurred absent the
doctor's negligence.233
Implicit in this formulation is the requirement that the proponent of successive
tortfeasor treatment "must still prove that the doctors' negligence proximately
caused an enhancement of the initial harm suffered at the hands of the original
tortfeasor. ' '234 The court also determined that if the proponent "fail[s] to introduce
any evidence of the injuries that [plaintiff] would have received absent negligence
229. Id. 34, 35 P.3d at 985.
230. In the court of appeals, Judges Apodoca and Hartz disagreed on the test for determining if tortfeasors
are successive. Judge Apodaca concluded that the test is whether there are "divisible and causally distinct injuries,"
Lewis (CA), 1999-NMCA-145, 43, 992 P.2d at 292 (Apodaca, J.) (emphasis added), and did not find fault with
the Lujan court's apparent endorsement of an additional five factors that Lujan suggested may be considered in
determining if torts are concurrent or successive. Id. Judge Hartz proposed a different and more stringent test.
Instead of requiring proof of separate and causally-distinct "injuries," he would require proof "showing what
damages would have been suffered if the alleged 'successive tort' had not occurred." Id. 91 73, 992 P.2d at 298
(Hartz, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (emphasis added). Judge Hartz' proposed test is based upon the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability, which refers to "damages" instead of "injuries" when
stating what must be capable of division by causation. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF
LIABILITY § 26 (2000). The comments to the Restatement, however, imply that the use of the word "damages" was
not intended as a conscious rejection of the requirement for the division of "injuries" as found in New Mexico law.
Id. § 26 cmt. f.
231. Lewis (SC), 2001 -NMSC-035,1 34, 35 P.3d at 985 (holding that the proponent of successive tortfeasor
treatment must prove "injuries separate from and in addition to the injuries which otherwise would have been
caused by the initial tort.") (emphasis added).
232. Hebenstreit v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 65 N.M. 301, 306, 336 P.2d 1057, 1061 (1959).
The court qualified this ruling when it noted that "conjecture, surmise or speculation" would not suffice to sustain
a jury verdict. Id.
233. Lewis (SC)Q, 2001-NMSC-035,1 34, 35 P.3d 985. The court declined to address the question of whether
the "five factors" identified in Lujan v. Healthsouth Rehab. Corp., 120 N.M. 422,426,902 P.2d 1025, 1029 (1995),
as relevant to the analysis would assist in this inquiry. Lewis (SC), 2001-NMSC-035, 9132 n.3, 35 P.2d at 984 n.3.
234. Lewis (SC), 2001-NMSC-035, 135, 35 P.3d at 986.
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on the part of [the medical] Defendants," the proponent "fail[s] to satisfy the second
element" of the Lujan test for successive tortfeasors.235
The supreme court also affirmed that when the plaintiff seeks to recover from the
physician for an enhanced injury, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving an
enhanced injury and the degree of enhancement.236 The court did not have occasion
to determine whether a defendant who seeks to prove that he is a successive
tortfeasor would then bear the burden of proof of the required elements. In the court
of appeals, Judge Hartz had noted that it is not always the plaintiff who will want
tortfeasors to be successive.237 The plaintiff sometimes may prefer to treat the injury
as indivisible and the contributing tortfeasors as concurrent, with the result that the
liability of each tortfeasor would depend upon that tortfeasor' s comparative fault. 8
In such cases, a defendant may prefer that the law applicable to successive
tortfeasors apply. Both Judge Apodaca and Judge Hartz agreed that whichever party
seeks to prove that tortfeasors are successive must bear the burden of proof of the
causal divisibility of the injuries.239 There is no reason to think that the supreme
court will rule differently when the issue arises.
The supreme court did not address a related question that the court of appeals
considered: Must a party who wants the tortfeasors to be treated as concurrent prove
that the plaintiff s injuries are not divisible? Judge Hartz concluded that when causal
division is not proven, "the injury is indivisible, ' 2' and thus no party has to present
evidence demonstrating that the injury was indivisible in order to have the court
treat the tortfeasors as concurrent. In effect, there would be a rebuttable presumption
that an injury is indivisible unless one party proves that it can be separated causally.
In accordance with this view, if a plaintiff proves that the combined fault of two
tortfeasors proximately caused an injury to the plaintiff, comparative fault principles
applicable to concurrent tortfeasors will apply unless the plaintiff or a defendant
pleads and proves that the injuries are separate and causally-distinct.24'
Judge Apodaca took a different position. He would impose a duty on the plaintiff
who is satisfied with application of the several liability doctrine to plead and prove
not only that the tortfeasors each were proximate causes of an injury but also to
prove affirmatively that the injury was indivisible.242
Judge Hartz' position is preferable. Tortfeasors who proximately contribute to an
injury should be severally liable in accordance with concurrent tortfeasor principles,
235. Id. 1 38, 35 P.3d at 987.
236. Id. 1 34, 35 P.3d at 985.
237. Lewis (CA), 1999-NMCA-145, 1 83, 992 P.2d at 301 (Hartz, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
238. In an enhanced injury case, "the plaintiff would prefer that the injury be treated as indivisible if (1) most
of the injuries would have occurred even if the seat belt had been satisfactory and (2) the tortfeasors causing the
crash were barely negligent and underinsured." Id. 1 83, 992 P.2d at 301 (Hartz, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
239. Id. 56, 992 P.2d at 295; Id. 83, 992 P.2d at 301 (Hartz, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
240. Id. 77, 992 P.2d at 300 (Hartz, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 26 (then § 50) (2000)).
241. Id. 1 78, 992 P.2d at 300 (Hartz, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part) ("Absent evidence that
damages can be divided, the damages are indivisible.").
242. If either a plaintiff or defendant wants to assert "that the theory of liability is one of successive and not
concurrent tortfeasor liability, or vice versa, the party arguing such liability has the burden of adducing evidence
not only of the negligence of the tortfeasor but of the divisibility or indivisibility of the injury." Id. 56, 992 P.2d
at 295 (emphasis added).
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absent proof that the injury is causally divisible.243 The Third Restatement supports
Judge Hartz' view that several liability for indivisible injuries is the norm, and that
whoever prefers joint and several liability has the burden of establishing causally-
distinct injuries: "A party alleging that damages are divisible has the burden to prove
that they are divisible. Unless sufficient evidence permits the factfinder to determine
that injuries are divisible, they are indivisible.' 2u
The portions of Lewis that refine the determination of when tortfeasors are
successive provide useful guidelines that are consistent with prior precedents. Other
aspects of the opinion are dealt with in Part Two of this article, 245 as are matters
concerning trial procedure in successive tortfeasor cases that were ruled on by the
court of appeals but not reviewed by the supreme court in Lewis.246
CONTINUING POCKETS OF JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
The Bartlett court adopted several liability, apparently without exception, for all
cases of concurrent tortfeasors.247 In the two years between Bartlett and the passage
of the Several Liability Act, New Mexico courts had no occasion to determine
whether exceptions to several liability were appropriate. In adopting the Several
Liability Act, the legislature determined that there were three specific situations in
which joint and several liability should continue to apply.2 48 The legislature
acknowledged that other types of cases might also be appropriate for joint and
several liability and delegated to the judiciary the authority to create additional
exceptions when required by sound public policy.249 To the four statutory
exceptions, the supreme court added a fifth exception. Rejecting legislative history
that suggested that the drafters intended to include successive as well as concurrent
tortfeasors within the ambit of several liability,250 the supreme court ruled that
successive tortfeasors are not subject to several liability but instead are jointly and
severally liable for the harm they cause.25'
These five exceptions are of great significance to tort litigators. Injured persons
will always prefer joint and several liability to several liability because they need not
sue all tortfeasors to recover fully and because the inability of any one tortfeasor to
pay a judgment is offset by the ability to recover all of one's damages from any
other tortfeasor.
243. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-I(D) (Michie 1996) (providing that only when separate injuries are
proven does the general rule of several liability give way to successive tortfeasor principles.).
244. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 26 cmt. h (2000).
245. For example, Lewis (SC) properly held that the comparative fault of Griego was not available as a partial
defense to the doctors because they were jointly and severally liable for the enhanced injury. 2001 -NMSC-035,
41, 35 P.3d at 988. Yet, the court ruled that "[d]efendants were entitled to rely on evidence of Griego's fault in their
argument that Griego's tortious actions were the sole proximate cause of Lewis's death." Id.
246. For example, the court of appeals dealt with the issues of who decides whether tortfeasors are successive,
Lewis (CA), 1999-NMCA-145, j 38, 55, 992 P.2d at 291, 295, when the determination is made, id. 138-45, 992
P.2d at 291-293, and the procedural steps that should be followed when it is not clear at the beginning of trial
whether the parties are successive or concurrent tortfeasors. Id. 91 55, 992 P.2d at 295.
247. 98 N.M. at 159, 646 P.2d at 581.
248. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-3A-1(c)(l)-(3) (Michie 1996).
249. Id. § 41-3A-1(c)(4).
250. Schultz & Occhialino, supra note 45, at 487.
251. Lujan, 120 N.M. 422,902 P.2d 1025; Lewis (SC), 2001-NMSC-035, 41,35 P.3d at 988. See supra note
178-246 and accompanying text.
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Intentional Wrongdoers
Still jointly and severally liable are tortfeasors "who acted with the intention of
inflicting injury or damage. 252 The provision reflects a legislative determination that
persons guilty of intentional misconduct are too culpable to be afforded the benefits
of several liability.253
Culpable conduct greater than negligence but less than intentional is not within
this exception. An earlier draft of the Several Liability Act provided that joint and
several liability also applied to persons "whose conduct is found to be malicious,
willful or wanton."2 54 Another draft would have continued joint and several liability
for all causes of action other than negligence.2 5 These proposals were eliminated
from the final bill. 6
The Several Liability Act imposes joint and several liability on intentional
wrongdoers but does not define "intentional." Proponents of joint and several
liability may seek to expand the definition of "intentional" beyond its standard
meaning to a more inclusive definition. The Second Restatement, for example,
provides that a person acts with "intent" not only when "the actor desires to cause
consequences of his act," but also when the actor "believes that the consequences
are substantially certain to result from it. '257 The latter definition, more easily met
than the "desires" provision, has been incorporated into the New Mexico law of
battery. 8 Moreover, in a different context, the New Mexico Supreme Court recently
has shown a willingness to expand the types of culpable conduct by a wrongdoer
that can trigger greater benefits to injured persons.259
The normative basis for imposing full liability on intentional tortfeasors is only
sometimes reflected in the rules concerning contribution and indemnity. The Third
Restatement, for example, imposes full liability on intentional tortfeasors 26° but
allows them thereafter to seek contribution from a tortfeasor who was merely
252. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-l(c)(1) (Michie 1996).
253. Schultz & Occhialino, supra note 45, at 488. Not all jurisdictions agree. See, e.g., Slack v. Farmers Ins.
Exchange, 5 P.3d 280 (Colo. 2000) (applying several ["pro-rata"] liability even to intentional tortfeasors).
254. Schultz & Occhialino, supra note 45, at 515, app. E, § l(C)(a).
255. Id. at 511, app. B, §§ 2(A), 2(D).
256. While inclusion of heightened forms of culpability within this specific exception is probably foreclosed,
the exception allowing forjoint and several liability when sound public policy dictates, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-
1(C)(4) (1996 Michie), could be the source of a successful argument that joint and several liability should apply to
claims asserting conduct more egregious than negligence but not rising to the level of an intentional tort.
257. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
258. California First Bank v. State, Ill N.M. 64, 73, n.6, 801 P.2d 646, 655, n.6 (1990) (noting that to
constitute a battery, one need not desire to bring about a harm: "[T]he term 'intent' also denotes 'that the actor
believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from [the action taken.]'). But see Johnson
Controls World Services, Inc. v. Bames, 115 N.M. 116, 847 P.2d 761 (Ct. App. 1993), cert. denied, 115 N.M. 79,
847 P.2d 313 (declining to apply "substantial certainty" definition in determining whether worker can sue employer
for common law tort of battery), overruled by Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 2001-NMSC-034, 34 P.3d
1148, 1156 (rejecting "actual intent" as sole test and adding "willfulness" alternative in Workers' Compensation
non-exclusivity cases).
259. Delgado, 2001-NMSC-034 26, 34 P.3d at 1156 (holding that a worker may sue employer in common
law action when employer "expects the intentional act or omission to result in the injury or has utterly disregarded
the consequences").
260. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 12 (2000).
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negligent.26' In contrast, at common law262 or by statute,26 3 some jurisdictions bar
intentional tortfeasors from obtaining contribution from other wrongdoers. This
dichotomy also exists with regard to the issue of whether a negligent tortfeasor can
obtain full indemnification from an intentional tortfeasor. Some jurisdictions
provide that a negligent tortfeasor who is partly responsible for the plaintiffs
damages may collect full indemnity from an intentional tortfeasor who also
contributed to the plaintiff s injuries. 64 The Third Restatement reaches the opposite
conclusion.265
New Mexico has not resolved the question of whether intentional tortfeasors who
discharge the full liability to an injured person are entitled to contribution from other
wrongdoers. The issue involves the same weighing of competing policies that
determine whether intentional tortfeasors should be able to take advantage of several
liability2 66 and the conclusion therefore should be the same. 267 New Mexico imposedjoint and several liability on intentional tortfeasors because "the intentional
wrongdoer forfeits his right to the equitable principle of apportionment of liability
based upon fault."2 6' The forfeiture should apply equally to impose joint and several
liability and to bar intentional tortfeasors from contribution or indemnity.
The statutory exception bars the intentional tortfeasor from laying off fault on
others. It does not bar a negligent tortfeasor from laying off fault on the intentional
tortfeasor.269 When an intentional and a negligent tortfeasor combine to cause harm
to the plaintiff, the intentional tortfeasor is fully liable for the injuries but the
negligent tortfeasor may reduce his liability by the percentage of fault attributable
to the intentional wrongdoer.2 7' Acknowledging that juries may have a tendency to
attribute more fault to intentional wrongdoing than to merely negligent conduct, the
supreme court has promulgated a Uniform Jury Instruction designed to check the
proclivity of juries to do so. 27'
261. Id. § 23 cmt. I ("A person who can otherwise recover contribution is not precluded from receiving
contribution by the fact that he is liable for an intentional tort.").
262. E.g., Ziarko v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 641 N.E.2 Id 402 (1l1. 1994) (holding intentional tortfeasor barred from
contribution though reckless tortfeasor is not barred).
263. E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 17.255 (2001).
264. E.g., Fleming v. Threshermen's Mutual Ins. Co., 388 N.W.2d 908 (Wis. 1986).
265. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 22 cmt. e (2000) (stating that
ultimate allocation between negligent and intentional tortfeasor should always be by contribution rather than
indemnity).
266. New Mexico courts are committed to the principle that "apportionment of the total damages resulting
from.. loss or injury [should be] in proportion to the fault of each party," Scott, 96 N.M. at 688, 634 P.2d at 1240,
but temper that principle by denying the benefits of several liability to intentional tortfeasors, N.M. STAT. ANN. §
41-3A-I(C)(l) (Michie 1996), because of the greater moral culpability of an intentional tortfeasor. Schultz &
Occhialino, supra note 45, at 488.
267. The only argument for distinguishing between them would be that the rejection of several liability
benefits the plaintiff by providing a single source for full recovery while allowing contribution thereafter may be
permissible because there is then no need for a rule favoring the plaintiff. But that policy argument is forcefully
countered by Judge Woods' declaration that there is no rational reason for writing rules favoring plaintiffs. Bartlett,
98 N.M. at 158, 646 P.2d at 585.
268. Schultz & Occhialino, supra note 45, at 488.
269. Reichert, 117 N.M. 623, 875 P.2d 379.
270. Id.
271. N.M. U.J.I. CiV. 13-1320 (1996). The instruction, as drafted, applies only to landowners whose
negligence consists of failure to use care to prevent an intentional wrongdoer from injuring a visitor on the land:
"[Tihe proportionate fault of the [owner] [occupant] is not necessarily reduced by the increasingly wrongful conduct
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Vicarious Liability
The statutory exception imposing joint and several liability when a person is
vicariously liable for the conduct of another person272 is premised upon the fact that
a vicariously liable person is guilty of no fault but is held liable for the fault of
another for reasons of policy. There is thus no basis for comparing fault when only
one person is at fault but two persons are liable for the resulting harm.273
The most common example of vicarious liability is respondeat superior. 274 The
statutory exception is not so limited but extends to any theory of recovery by which
vicarious liability is imposed on one person for the wrongs of another. For example,
when one of the exceptions to the general rule that an employer of an independent
contractor is not vicariously liable for the contractor's torts applies,275 the employer
will be jointly and severally liable with the contractor for the fault attributable to the
contractor.276
In an opinion decided under Bartlett, rather than the Several Liability Act, the
court of appeals significantly expanded the scope of what is now the Act's
"vicarious liability" exception. In Medina v. Graham's Cowboys, Inc.,277 a person
with a known history of getting into fights with fellow bar patrons was hired by the
bar to "maintain[] peace and order.. .using force if necessary." '278 On the night he
struck Medina outside the bar, the employee was not on duty but was present
because he had been asked to come to the bar to work if needed. The trial court ruled
that respondeat superior was not applicable because the employee was not in the
scope of his employment when he assaulted the patron. The trial court ruled, instead,
that the bar was liable for negligent hiring and training of the employee and that the
bar was jointly and severally liable with Medina for the patron's injuries. On appeal,
the bar asserted that it should have been permitted to reduce its liability by the
percentage of fault of the employee who assaulted the plaintiff.
The court of appeals affirmed the ruling imposing full liability on the bar. The
court acknowledged that, unlike joint and several liability imposed on an employer
under respondeat superior, negligent hiring and supervision imposes liability upon
of the third person." Id. With suitable modifications, it can be used in other situations in which a person owes a duty
to protect a person from intentional wrongdoers. E.g., Sarracino v. Martinez, 117 N.M. 193, 870 P.2d 155 (Ct. App.
1994) (addressing a duty to prevent intentional injury to intoxicated person of whom the defendant has taken
control).
272. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1(C)(2) (Michie 1996).
273. Schultz & Occhialino, supra note 45, at 490. See also Medina v. Graham's Cowboys, Inc., 113 N.M.
471, 475, 827 P.2d 859, 863 (Ct. App. 1992) ("Because liability is not predicated on the fault of the employer, the
abolition of joint and several liability does not eliminate respondeat superior liability.").
274. "The law in New Mexico is well settled that, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer can
be vicariously liable for the negligent acts of an employee when committed during the course and scope of the
employee's employment." Baer v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 118 N.M. 685, 690, 884 P.2d 841, 846 (Ct.
App. 1994).
275. Budagher v. Amrep Corp., 97 N.M. 116, 119, 637 P.2d 547, 550 (1981) ("While it is a general rule that
an employer is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor, the rule is subject to numerous
exceptions."). See also Saiz v. Belen Sch. Dist., 113 N.M. 387, 827 P.2d 102 (1992).
276. Schultz & Occhialino, supra note 45, at 490-91.
277. 113 N.M., 471, 827 P.2d, 859 (Ct. App. 1992).
278. Id. at 472, 827 P.2d at 860.
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the employer for its own fault.279 The court nonetheless imposed joint and several
liability when negligent hiring is a proximate cause of the infliction of intentional
harm to a person by the negligently hired employee. The court found it to be "a
natural extension of the doctrine of respondeat superior" to hold the employer
"vicariously liable" for the torts of the negligently hired employee.2 80 The court
further extended the potential scope of its ruling by suggesting that "the doctrine of
respondeat superior might properly be extended to impose upon employers vicarious
liability for any tort by a servant that is a reasonably foreseeable result of the
employment relationship. 28'
Though never challenged, Medina has not been followed or extended.282 The
court's premise that vicarious liability can follow from the employer's own
negligence would greatly expand the scope of the vicarious liability exception in the
Several Liability Act. Proponents of extending vicarious liability to cases where the
employer is negligent in hiring or supervising an employee will have to overcome
the existing common law definition of vicarious liability, which excludes situations
where the liability is imposed because of the fault of the employer. 283
It is likely that the vicarious liability exception to several liability applies when
plaintiffs seek to hold some defendants liable for the conduct of other negligent
actors if all of them are part of a joint enterprise. In Roderick v. Lake,28 4 the injured
plaintiff, seeking to overcome the problem of identifying the actual negligent actor,
alleged that the actors were engaged in a joint venture, thus making each jointly and
severally liable for the acts of all.285 The trial court agreed, reasoning that "a joint
venture is a partnership for a single transaction.. .and partners are jointly and
severally liable for the obligations of a partnership."2 6 The court of appeals reversed
because there was insufficient evidence of a joint venture, while "[a]ssuming,
without deciding, that a joint venture between two or more concurrent tortfeasors
would make them jointly and severally liable."2 7 The Third Restatement provision
imposing joint and several liability whenever "liability is imposed based on the
tortious acts of another" also is broad enough to cover joint ventures.288
279. Id. at 475, 827 P.2d at 863.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 476, 827 P.2d at 864.
282. In Eckhardt v. Charter Hosp., 124 N.M. 549,953 P.2d 722 (Ct. App. 1997), the court of appeals affirmed
a verdict and judgment against an employer for negligent hiring and supervision, but it is not clear whether thejudgment reflected joint and several liability for the tort of the employee.
283. Saiz, 113 N.M. at 399,827 P.2d at 114 ("Under vicarious liability, one person, although entirely innocent
of any wrongdoing and without regard to duty, is nonetheless held responsible for harm caused by the wrongful act
of another.") (emphasis added). See also RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OFTORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 13 cmt.
c (2000) ("The vicariously liable party has not committed any breach of duty to the plaintiff but is held liable simply
as a matter of legal imputation of responsibility for another's tortious act.").
284. 108 N.M. 696, 778 P.2d 443 (Ct. App. 1989) cert. denied, 108 N.M. 681, 777 P.2d 1325.
285. Id. at 700, 778 P.2d at 447.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 13 (2000).
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New Mexico recognizes a cause of action for civil conspiracy,289 to which the
court of appeals has stated the doctrine of joint and several liability applies: "The
purpose of a civil conspiracy claim is to impute liability to make members of the
conspiracy jointly and severally liable for the torts of any of its members."29
Consistently with New Mexico's position, the Third Restatement provides that
persons who act in concert are jointly and severally liable for the share of fault
attributable to any person engaged in the concerted activity.29' In addition to the
usual scenarios, a Restatement comment states that a person who directs tortious
conduct by another, even though not an employer of that person, is jointly and
severally liable for the torts committed by the person being directed. 92 Injured
persons, seeking the benefits of joint and several liability increasingly will turn to
theories of civil conspiracy and joint venture to come within the statutory exception
imposing joint and several liability on parties vicariously liable for the torts of
others.
The joint and several liability of the vicariously liable person may not be for the
full amount of the plaintiffs damages. The Several Liability Act imposes joint and
several liability only for the portion of the total fault that is attributable to the
tortfeasor for whom the defendant is vicariously liable.293 Thus, if an employee is
found thirty percent at fault and a third person is seventy percent at fault, the
defendant liable vicariously for the tort of the employee is jointly and severally
liable with the employee for only thirty percent of the total damages. Once the
vicariously liable tortfeasor pays the joint and several judgment, a claim for full
indemnification from the employee normally will be available to the vicariously
liable tortfeasor.294
289. Ettleson v. Burke, 2001-NMCA-003, 17 P.3d440(Ct. App. 2001). The elements of civil conspiracy are
"(1) that a conspiracy between two or more individuals existed; (2) that specific wrongful acts were caried out by
the defendants pursuant to the conspiracy; and (3) that the plaintiff was damaged as a result." Silva v. Town of
Springer, 121 N.M. 428, 434, 912 P.2d 304, 310 (1996). In addition, a civil conspiracy is not actionable "unless a
civil action in damages would lie against one of the conspirators." Armijo v. Nat'l Sur. Corp, 58 N.M. 166, 178,
268 P.2d 339, 347 (1954); Ettleson, 2001-NMCA-003, 12, 17 P.3d at 445.
290. Ettleson, 2001-NMCA-003, 12, 17 P.3d at 445. When the conspiracy is formed in order to commit
intentional torts, joint and several liability will apply under the "intentional tortfeasor" exception, N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 41-3A- I (c)(1) (Michie 1996), if not under the "vicarious liability" exception.
291. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 15 (2000).
292. Id. § 15 cmt. b.
293. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-l(C)(2) (1996 Michie).
294. Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Welch, 78 N.M. 494, 495, 433 P.2d 79, 80 (1967) ("[A] tortfeasor's
employer who has been held liable on the theory of respondeat superior may recover indemnification from the
tortfeasor only where the employer's liability is based solely upon that doctrine and where there is not actual or
active negligence on the part of the employer.").
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Products Liability
Because strict products liability is a no-fault theory of recovery,295 there is no
basis for comparing the fault of those whose liability is premised solely on strict
products liability. The factfinder is thus unable to compare the fault of
manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers, each of whom is strictly liable for
marketing defective products. Acknowledging the problem,196 the legislature has
determined that all persons strictly liable for the manufacture and sale of defective
products are jointly and severally liable for the full portion of the liability
attributable to the defective product. 97
Where plaintiff's injuries were caused in part by the defective product and in part
through the fault of a third person, the joint and several liability of the manufacturers
and distributors is limited to the portion of the damages attributable to the defective
product.29 Thus, for example, the manufacturer and retailer of a car with defective
brakes can lay off fault on the driver of another vehicle whose negligent driving
combined with the defective brakes of the car's owner to cause injury to the owner
of the car.299
The injured person might assert claims alternatively for negligence and for strict
products liability against the manufacturer and distributors of a defective product.3 °°
If the factfinder concludes that negligence of two or more of the defendants in the
chain of distribution caused plaintiff's injuries, those defendants will be severally
liable in accordance with their comparative fault.30 ' If also found liable for strict
products liability, the same defendants are jointly and severally liable.30 2 The
plaintiff who obtains verdicts on both theories will prefer entry of joint and several
liability judgments against each defendant rather than a partial judgment against
each based on comparative fault. Presumably the court would enter the joint and
several liability judgment0 3 or would enter judgments reflecting both the negligence
and the strict liability verdicts,"° leaving the plaintiff to choose which to enforce.30 5
295. Hinger v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 120 N.M. 430, 437, 902 P.2d 1033, 1040 (Ct. App. 1995),
cert. denied, 120 N.M. 312, 900 P.2d 962 ("[O]ne of the hallmarks of a strict liability lawsuit [is] liability without
negligence. Under strict products liability.. suppliers of goods are absolutely liable for defects which pose an
unreasonable risk of injury. In other words, reasonable care on the part of the supplier is no defense.").
296. Schultz & Occhialino, supra note 45, at 492.
297. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1(C)(3) (Michie 1996).
298. Id. (noting that strict products liability applies "only to that portion" of the total liability attributed to
those strictly liable).
299. Schultz & Occhialino, supra note 45, at 492-93.
300. Trujillo v. Berry, 106 N.M. 86, 89, 738 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. H & P
Equip. Co. v. Berry, 106 NM. 24, 738 P.2d 518 ("Strict products liability does not...preclude liability against a
retailer based upon the alternative ground of negligence of the seller where such negligence can be proved.").
301. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-I(A) (Michie 1996).
302. Id. § 41-3A-1(C)(3).
303. Just as the plaintiff has a choice of theories and cannot be compelled to plead or go to the jury on a cause
of action that the plaintiff declines to pursue, Enriquez v. Cochran, 126 N.M. 196, 217, 967 P.2d 1136, 1157 (Ct.
App. 1998), the plaintiff should be able to forego a verdict based on negligence in preference to entry of a judgment
consistent with the portion of the verdict finding strict product liability.
304. A plaintiff might want judgments reflecting the negligence verdicts even when victorious at trial on the
strict liability theory as a fallback position in case the strict liability judgments are reversed on appeal.
305. If the plaintiff collects the full amount of thp joint and several liability judgment from one tortfeasor,
that tortfeasor can pursue a claim for comparative contribution based upon the percentages of fault allocated in the
negligence action. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-2 (Michie 1996) (contribution among joint tortfeasors based on
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Public Policy
The drafters of the Several Liability Act considered many exceptions to several
liability. In the three situations where there Was agreement, the Act creates
exceptions.3"6 Where consensus was lacking, the drafters chose not to decide
between competing positions but to leave to the courts the task of identifying and
creating additional pockets of joint and several liability.0 7 The Several Liability Act
provides that in addition to the three listed exceptions, joint and several liability
applies "to situations.. .having a sound basis in public policy.""3 8 The judiciary has
construed this delegated authority broadly, the court of appeals noting that "[t]here
are no specific limitations in the public policy exception itself which would restrict
the traditional common-law function of the courts in this area. ,
3°9
The policies supporting the three existing exceptions to several liability provide
guidance in determining when to create additional exceptions. The vicarious liability
exception and the strict products liability exception primarily are premised upon the
functional difficulty of comparing fault when one or more potential defendants is
not guilty of fault.3"0 Where there is no basis for apportioning fault, joint and several
liability is a practical necessity. The supreme court acknowledged this when it
confirmed that because contract liability is not based on fault, several liability has
no place in determining the scope of a contract breacher's liability to the plaintiff.3 1'
Where the liability of each possible defendant is based only on no-fault theories of
recovery, joint and several liability is appropriate. Where, however, a defendant's
liability is premised on a no-fault theory, that defendant can lay off fault on others
who were negligent. The products liability exception,"' for example, prevents
certain persons who are each liable without fault from laying off fault on one
another but provides for several liability based on fault allocations where some
tortfeasors are guilty of negligence and others are chargeable only with strict
products liability.313 Thus, joint and several liability is justified not simply when one
tortfeasor is liable on a no fault theory, but rather when two or more tortfeasors are
each liable without fault, with the result that there is no basis for comparing fault.
comparative fault).
306. Id. § 41-3A-1(C)(1)(2)(3).
307. Where consensus on exceptions could not be reached, the drafters "agreed to disagree and to leave the
courts free to determine on a case-by-case basis whether additional pockets of joint and several liability should
survive the general adoption of several liability in New Mexico." Schultz & Occhialino, supra note 45, at 493.
308. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1(C)(4) (Michie 1996).
309. Enriquez, 126 N.M. at 220-21,967 P.2d at 1160-61.
310. Schultz & Occhialino, supra note 45, at 490-92.
311. Allsup's, 127 N.M. at 11,976 P.2d at I1. The court did not create a "public policy exception" for contract
cases. Instead, it noted that comparative negligence is not a defense in contract actions and that the Several Liability
Act applies only to causes of action in which the defense of comparative negligence applies. Id.
312. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1(C)(3) (Michie 1996).
313. Schultz & Occhialino, supra note 45, at 492. See also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41 -3A- I (C)(3) (Michie 1996).
Despite an initial attempt in Scott, 96 N.M. at 688, 634 P.2d at 1240 (comparative causation or comparative
misconduct), to do so, the supreme court has never fully explained how fault and non-fault can be compared without
attributing zero percent of the fault to the no-fault wrongdoer and 100 percent to the only tortfeasor guilty of fault.
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The legislative determination that intentional tortfeasors are jointly and severally
liable314 is not based upon inability to compare fault, but on a determination that
persons guilty of egregious misconduct forfeit the right to enjoy the liability-
reducing benefits of several liability.315 Courts will undoubtedly confront the
question of what conduct short of intentional wrongdoing suffices to trigger joint
and several liability. The legislative history of the exception for intentional
misconduct suggests that the legislature did not reject joint and several liability for
conduct more culpable than negligence and less culpable than intentional, but
"signal[ed] a lack of consensus and a decision to leave to the court, in construing the
'public policy' exception, the resolution of the issue."316 Any such expansion ofjoint
and several liability in New Mexico will occur without the approval of the Third
Restatement, which declines to extend joint and several liability to tortfeasors whose
conduct constitutes "gross negligence, recklessness or similar conduct." ' 7
Courts also will consider whether plaintiffs generally or particular plaintiffs are
deserving of the additional financial security afforded by joint and several liability.
The argument in favor of plaintiffs as a class is unlikely to be successful. Bartlett
rejected the proposition that joint and several liability should be maintained in order
to favor plaintiffs as a class over defendants3"8 and reversal of that policy choice is
not likely. Certain categories of plaintiffs, however, have arguments peculiar to their
circumstances that may persuade a court to impose joint and several liability. For
example, an early draft of the Several Liability Act would have distinguished
between plaintiffs who were free of negligence and those who were guilty of
comparative negligence.3"9 The former, not needing the benefit of the substitution
of comparative negligence for contributory negligence, would not suffer the loss of
joint and several liability, while the latter, dependent upon comparative fault
principles for recovery, would have comparative fault principles applied to reduce
their recovery from each tortfeasor.32° That the legislature did not adopt this proposal
does not foreclose the possibility that public policy would be best served by its
adoption.'32
314. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-l(C)(1) (Michie 1996).
315. Schultz & Occhialino, supra note 45, at 488.
316. Id. at 489. Omitted from the final version of the Several Liability Act was a provision in an earlier draft
extending joint and several liability not only to intentional tortfeasors but also to those "whose conduct is found to
be malicious, willful or wanton." Id. at 514, app. E.
317. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 12 cmt. b (2000).
318. Bartlett, 98 N.M. at 158, 646 P.2d at 585.
319. Schultz & Occhialino, supra note 45, at 510, app. B.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 489. Adoption of this exception often would pose tactical problems for the parties. Until the
factfinder determined at the end of the trial whether the defense of comparative negligence was proven, the plaintiff
and defendant would not know whether several or joint and several liability applied. Yet litigation tactics that must
be formulated much earlier in the proceeding depend upon the answer to the question. Faced with this uncertainty,
the plaintiff probably would have to assume that the factfinder would find him guilty of comparative negligence
and thus that several liability would apply. This would compel plaintiff to identify and to sue all potential
tortfeasors, an effort that would be unnecessary if the factfinder later concluded that plaintiff was not negligent and
thus that joint and several liability applied against a single target defendant. Likewise, defendants would have to
assume that several liability would apply and thus that they had to introduce evidence of one another's fault at trial,
though the evidence would be irrelevant if joint and several liability applied because the plaintiff was found not
negligent.
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Legislative policies embedded in particular legislation also might influence a
court construing the public policy exception in the Several Liability Act. The
supreme court has acknowledged that the legislature is the primary source of state
public policy, 322 and when statutes create causes of action or assist in determining
whether common law duties have been violated, the policies underlying the statute
may inform a court's decision whether to create an additional pocket of joint and
several liability.
New Mexico courts have created only a single public policy exception to date. In
Saiz v. Belen School District,323 a thirteen-year-old boy was electrocuted at a night
football game due to faulty wiring installed ten years earlier by an independent
contractor employed by the school district. The supreme court ruled that when an
employer hires an independent contractor to do work that a reasonable person would
recognize as likely to create a peculiar risk of harm to others if reasonable
precautions are not taken, the employer is liable when those precautions are not
taken.3 24 The employer's liability is not vicarious; it does not depend on a finding
that the independent contractor is liable to the injured person.325 Instead, it is a
direct, strict liability 326 of the employer, imposed even in the absence of proof of
fault of the independent contractor, and is based on the breach of the duty of the
employer to assure that adequate precautions are taken to prevent harm to others.
3 27
In cases to which Saiz applies, "the employer is jointly and severally liable for
harm apportioned to any independent contractor" who failed to take necessary
precautions.328 The imposition of joint and several liability is pursuant to the public
policy exception in the Several Liability Act and "is grounded in a special public
policy to protect third persons in an area of inherent danger and to encourage
322. Torres v. State, 119 N.M. 609, 612, 894 P.2d 386, 389 (1995) ("With deference to constitutional
principles, it is the particular domain of the legislature, as the voice of the people, to make public policy.").
323. 113 N.M. 387, 827 P.2d 102 (1992).
324. Id. at 395, 827 P.2d at 110.
325. Id. ("[W]e reject any requirement.. .that liability of the employer is dependent upon failure of the
independent contractor to exercise reasonable care. The focus is on the presence or absence of a necessary
precaution, not on whether an independent contractor's failure to take the precaution may be excused or justified
under a reasonably prudent person standard."). Had the court characterized its holding as creating another exception
to the oft-excepted general rule that employers of independent contractors are not liable for the torts of the
contractor, see id. at 393-94, 827 P.2d at 108-09, there would have been no need to use the public policy exception.
The specific exception imposing joint and several liability upon a person vicariously liable would have applied. See
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1(C) (2) (Michie 1996). In Saiz, a vicarious liability approach would not have benefited
the plaintiff because the independent contractor was shielded from liability to the plaintiff by a statute of repose.
See Saiz, 113 N.M. at 401, 827 P.2d at 116.
326. 113 N.M. at 394, 821 P.2d at 109 (defining "direct strict liability"). The threshold for establishing
liability is to demonstrate that the work involves a "peculiar risk," which is work that is "inherently or intrinsically
dangerous" in that it "is very likely to cause harm if a reasonable precaution.. is not taken." Id. at 396, 823 P.2d at
11. For conduct creating a peculiar risk, "[t]he test of liability is the presence or absence of precautions that would
be deemed reasonably necessary by one to whom knowledge of all the circumstances is attributed; and liability is
dependent on neither the lack of care taken by the contractor nor the lack of care taken by the employer to ensure
that the contractor takes necessary precautions." Id. at 394-95, 821 P.2d at 109-10.
327. Id. at 395, 821 P.2d at 110.
328. Id. at 400, 823 P.2d at 115. The employer, if liable, would be jointly and severally liable not only for
the conduct of the contractor who installed the electrical system but also for the fault, if any, of an architect who
supervised installation and inspected the system. Id. The employer would also be solely liable for any fault that the
factfinder attributed to the employer. Id.
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conscientious adherence to standards of safety where injury likely will result in the
absence of precautions. 329
In numerous cases, plaintiffs have tried to impose Saiz liability upon defendants.
The cases focus on whether a peculiar risk is present and most conclude that the Saiz
requirements have not been met.33 In Enriquez v. Cochran,33' the court of appeals
did apply Saiz. Enriquez, an employee of the Conquistador Council, a local chapter
of the Boy Scouts of America (BSA), was injured while felling trees at a BSA camp.
He received workers' compensation benefits from the Conquistador Council and
then sued BSA. In the trial court, Enriquez asserted that BSA was liable for its own
tortious conduct and jointly and severally liable for the Council's share of the
liability. 332 The jury assigned 75 percent of the fault to BSA, 15 percent to the
Council, and 10 percent to Enriquez. The exclusivity provision of the Workers'
Compensation Act barred Enriquez from recovering from the Council the 15 percent
attributed to the Council's fault.33 3 Enriquez sought to collect that percentage from
BSA by arguing that BSA's tree-cutting created a peculiar risk of harm under Saiz,
thus making BSA liable for its own fault and also jointly liable for the fault of the
Council. The trial court disagreed and entered judgment against BSA only for 75
percent of plaintiffs damages. In a well-crafted opinion, the court of appeals
extensively reviewed and applied the elements of a Saiz claim and concluded that
BSA was jointly and severally liable pursuant to Saiz for the 15 percent of the
damages attributable to the Council's fault.334
Saiz provides three benefits to plaintiffs. First, Saiz imposes strict liability upon
the employer of the independent contractor, thus eliminating the need to prove fault
of the employer or of the contractor.335 In addition, because the employer's Saiz
liability is not premised on or dependent upon the contractor's fault but is a strict
liability of the employer, the employer is liable to plaintiff for the damages
attributable to the fault of the independent contractor even when the contractor
would not be liable to the plaintiff.36 Finally, and directly relevant to apportionment
329. Id.
330. See, e.g., Gabaldon v. Erisa Mortgage Co., 128 N.M. 84, 990 P.2d 197 (1999) (involving near drowning
at wave pool in water park); Abeita v. N. Rio Arriba Elec. Coop., 124 N.M. 97, 946 P.2d 1108 (Ct. App. 1997)
(involving electrocution from power line located near building); Seal v. Carlsbad Indep. Sch. Dist., 116 N.M.101,
860 P.2d 743 (1993) (involving drowning at swimming pool lacking lifeguards).
331. 126 N.M. 196, 967 P.2d 1136 (Ct. App. 1998), cert. denied, 126 N.M. 532 (1998).
332. Id. at 218, 967 P.2d at 1158.
333. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-6(E) (Michie 1991).
334. BSA asserted that Saiz was distinguishable because BSA had not hired the Council as an independent
contractor. The court ruled that Saiz applied to a fact pattern distinguishable from Saiz itself: "the Saiz rationale can
be applied to a factual situation not involving a property owner or other employer of an independent contractor."
126 N.M. at 221, 967 P.2d at 1161.
335. Saiz, 113 N.M. at 394, 821 P.2d at 109 (applying "direct strict liability").
336. Id. at 401, 827 P.2d at 116 ("We see no reason not to impose full responsibility on a joint tortfeasor
subject to strict liability for breach of a nondelegable duty despite the fact that the plaintiffs direct suit against the
other tortfeasors is barred ..... ). Saiz and Enriquez illustrate the importance of this benefit. In Saiz, a statute of
repose protected the contractor from liability to the plaintiff, so that recovery for the contractor's misconduct only
could come from the employer school district. Id. See also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-27 (Michie 1990) (limiting
actions for defective or unsafe conditions caused by construction of improvements to real property). In Enriquez,
plaintiff could not successfully sue the Council because his sole remedy against his employer, the Council, was for
Workers' Compensation. Enriquez, 126 N.M at 201, 967 P.2d at 1141. See also N. M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-9 (Michie
1991).
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issues, the employer's strict liability encompasses any fault attributable to the
independent contractor, making the employer fully liable for the fault of the
independent contractor as part of its own strict liability.337 The plaintiff, therefore,
need not join the independent contractor as a defendant in order to recover for any
fault attributed to the contractor, need not worry about defenses the contractor has,
nor be concerned about whether the contractor is able to pay its comparative share
of the plaintiff s judgment. Instead, plaintiff can focus on establishing the elements
of a Saiz claim against the employer.
It is difficult to determine whether Saiz and Enriquez will serve to extend broadly
the public policy exception beyond cases involving employers and independent
contractors. The Saiz court focused on the justification for and the elements of the
strict liability claim against the employer rather than upon the justification for
imposing joint and several liability. The court's rationale for joint and several
liability was limited to finding "a special public policy to protect third persons in an
area of inherent danger and to encourage conscientious adherence to standards of
safety....,338
That the court will not broadly create exceptions whenever the danger is great and
injury likely to occur is demonstrated by the court's ruling in Reichert v. Atler.339
The danger to patrons was obviously great at the A-Mi-Gusto Lounge, "one of the
most dangerous bars in Bernalillo County and... the scene of numerous shootings,
stabbings and assaults. ' 34 Castillo was a patron of the bar when he was confronted
by a belligerent, intoxicated fellow patron, Ochoa. The bartender knew of rumors
that Ochoa was dangerous, had been in fights before, carried a handgun, and had
killed someone once before, but did nothing to protect Castillo from Ochoa. Ochoa
shot Castillo six times, killing him, and fled the bar. Castillo's estate sued the bar
owners alleging a negligent failure to protect Castillo from the foreseeable risk of
violence at the hands of Ochoa. The trial court found the bar owners negligent,
refused to allow the bar owners to lay off fault on Ochoa, and held them jointly and
severally liable with Ochoa for the death of Castillo. The court of appeals reversed,
holding that there was no basis for refusing to allow the bar owners to reduce their
liability by laying off blame on Ochoa.34 The supreme court granted certiorari and
ruled that no public policy justified the imposition of joint and several liability on
the owners of the bar.342
Plaintiff argued that without joint and several liability the owners' incentive to
protect patrons would be diminished because they could shift most of the blame to
337. Saiz, 113 N.M. at 400,821 P.2d at 115.
338. Id. at 400, 827 P.2d at 115. Enriquez reiterates the "public policy concern to maximize the care taken
by persons... sufficiently connected with inherently dangerous activity to have some influence on its conduct,"
Enriquez, 126 N.M at 224, 967 P.2d at 1164, while also noting that compared to the Council, the BSA "is much
better equipped than local councils, financially and in terms of staff to deal with the safety issues." Id. at 225, 967
P.2d at 1165.
339. 117 N.M. 623, 875 P.2d 379 (1994).
340. Id. at 624, 875 P.2d at 380.
341. Reichert, 117 N.M. 628, 875 P.2d 384, rev'd on other grounds, 117 N.M. 623, 875 P.2d 379 (1994).
342. 117 N.M. at 625, 875 P.2d at 381 ("We cannot find a sound basis in public policy to abrogate the
legislature's determination that comparative-fault principles should apply; rather, we believe that public policy
would support a holding that the bar owner may reduce his liability by the percent of fault attributable to a third
party.").
Winter 2003)
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
the intentional wrongdoer. The court acknowledged that other jurisdictions imposed
joint and several liability under these circumstances and agreed that premises owners
must be encouraged to protect patrons but concluded that imposing joint liability
was not necessary to accomplish the goal.343 Instead, the court proposed a Uniform
Jury Instruction designed to remind jurors that, in cases involving harm to persons
on the business premises of another, "the proportionate fault of the [owner]
[operator] is not necessarily reduced by the increasingly wrongful conduct of the
third person.,, 344 Reichert concluded that the fact that it was a foreseeable intentional
tortfeasor who the landowner failed to protect the patron from was not a basis for
imposing joint and several liability on the land owner.3 45 It is difficult to conclude
that the risk of electrocution more than ten years after the negligent installation of
a lighting system in a football stadium is more dangerous and thus more worthy of
joint and several liability than the risk of being shot by a drunk fellow patron in a
notorious bar.
346
Despite the Reichert opinion rejecting joint and several liability in this class of
cases, Saiz continues to offer some opportunity for the application of joint and
several liability to cases in which a person breaches a duty to protect persons from
intentional tortfeasors. The case for limiting or overruling Reichert is made in the
Third Restatement. Section 14 provides that "a person who is liable to another based
on a failure to protect the other from the specific risk of an intentional tort is jointly
and severally liable for the share of comparative responsibility assigned to the
intentional tortfeasor in addition to the share of comparative responsibility assigned
to the person. 347 The Restatement provision is intended to avoid the likelihood that
a plaintiff otherwise would go largely uncompensated because juries will often
allocate the greatest percentage of fault to the intentional tortfeasor who likely will
lack the resources to compensate the victim. 48 The provision also seeks to reduce
the likelihood of injury by imposing joint and several liability as an additional
incentive for care for those responsible for protecting others from the acts of
intentional wrongdoers.349 The Restatement provision applies only when the harm
343. Id. at 626, 875 P.2d at 382.
344. Id. The proposed instruction was adopted by the Committee on Uniform Jury Instructions for Civil
Cases. N.M. U.J.I. Civ. 13-1320 (1996). The court of appeals noted that the deterrent effect of an award of punitive
damages would provide additional incentive for landowners to fulfill their duty to protect patrons from third
persons. Reichert, 117 N.M. at 636, 875 P.2d at 392.
345. Reichert, 117 N.M. at 625, 875 P.2d at 381 ("[T]he question whether the conduct of the third party is
intentional, negligent, or otherwise is not determinative in the application of comparative-fault principles in
situations similar to the one presented in this case.").
346. The quick answer is that Saiz does not apply to risks that are common and not unexpected by the public.
In Saiz, the court stated that a "peculiar risk" involved "a risk that is unusual or 'not a normal routine matter of
customary human activity'...and that is different from one to which persons commonly are subjected by ordinary
forms of negligence." Saiz, 113 N.M. at 396, 827 P.2d at I 1l. In Enriquez, 126 N.M. at 221, 967 P.2d at 1161, the
court of appeals refined the Saiz definition of "unusual" as one requiring "the relative rarity of the activity and the
concomitant lack of contact or experience with the activity and its dangers by the general public." In Gabaldon v.
Erisa Mortgage Co., 128 N.M. 84, 87, 990 P.2d 197, 200 (1999), the court adopted the language from Enriquez,
concluding that "if an activity is a 'common, every-day occurrence' and the public is familiar with the dangers
associated with the activity, the activity is not inherently dangerous." Presumably, bar patrons are aware that
intoxicated patrons are a routine risk in bars.
347. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 14 (2000).
348. Id. § 14 cmt. b.
349. Id.
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the defendant must guard against is an intentional tort by the third person.35° Where
the defendant negligently fails to protect the plaintiff from harm caused by the
negligence of a third person, Section 14 does not apply.35'
The Reichert court agreed that juries might attribute the bulk of the fault to the
intentional tortfeasor and thus undermine the incentive of land owners to protect the
plaintiff from intentional wrongdoers but decided that an adequate alternative to
joint and several liability is the jury instruction suggesting that juries be more subtle
in their assessment of relative fault.352 The court did not address the concern that the
fault assessed to the intentional tortfeasor may result in an uncollectable judgment
because the intentional tortfeasor will lack resources to pay or may have fled the
jurisdiction.353
Subsequent New Mexico cases demonstrate that the state will not likely stray
from the Reichert decision soon. After Reichert, the New Mexico Supreme Court
rendered an almost identical decision in Barth v. Coleman," reaffirming the
Reichert holding that the fault of the bar owner and the intentional actor should be
compared.355 The court reiterated that holding the premises owner fully responsible
when the intentional actor caused the injuries would be inconsistent with New
Mexico's commitment to holding tortfeasors liable only in accordance with their
share of fault.356
Barth, like Reichert, was a premises liability case. The same issue arises in other
contexts, as well. In Torres v. State,351 police allegedly failed to exercise reasonable
care to investigate a murder and apprehend the murderer. As a result, allegedly, two
other persons were killed by the murderer. The personal representatives of the two
later victims sued the police for wrongful death. The New Mexico Supreme Court
held that, if the failure of the police to investigate the first crime contributed to the
deaths of the plaintiffs' decedents, the fault of the police would be compared to the
fault of the assailant. 358 The Torres court relied on Reichert and Barth.359 Additional
cases illustrate fact patterns in which the issue may arise in the future, though in
350. Id.
351. The Restatement does not reject the application of joint and several liability to one who negligently fails
to protect the plaintiff from harm caused negligently by a third person. Instead, "the Restatement takes no position"
on the issue. Id. The comments note, however, that expansion of joint and several liability for negligent failure to
protect from negligent third persons would extend joint and several liability so broadly that it could "undermine the
policies embodied in a jurisdiction's decision to abrogate joint and several liability." Id.
352. Reichert, 117 N.M. at 623, 875 P.2d at 379. See also N.M. U.J.I. Civ. 13-1320 (1996).
353. Bartlett stated that the law has no reason to favor the plaintiff over a defendant. See Bartlett, 98 N.M.
at 158, 646 P.2d at 585. This rationale is undercut when the specific basis for imposition of a duty on the defendant
is to protect the plaintiff from the intentional wrongdoer.
354. 118 N.M. l, 878 P.2d 319 (1994).
355. Id. at 4, 878 P.2d at 323.
356. Id.
357. 119 N.M. 609, 894 P.2d 386 (1995).
358. Id. at 616, 894 P.2d at 393. In Sena v. New Mexico State Police, 119 N.M. 471, 474, 892 P.2d 604, 607
(Ct. App. 1995), the jury compared the fault of a police officer who negligently allowed a driver to continue driving
after smelling alcohol on his breath with the fault of the driver in causing the accident. The court of appeals reversed
the judgment on other grounds. Schear v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bernalillo County, 101 N.M. 671, 687 P.2d
728 (1984) (discussing negligence claim stated against police for failing to respond promptly to call of assault in
progress; no discussion of joint and several liability).
359. 119 N.M. at 616, 894 P.2d at 393.
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each case the appellate court had no occasion to determine whether joint and several
or only several liability would apply.3 °
The hesitancy in Reichert and Barth to deviate from the general rule of several
liability suggests that the public policy exception will not be expanded beyond Saiz
without creative arguments addressing concerns raised in those cases. Judge Wood
set the bar high in Bartlett when he declared several liability to be the fairest method
of allocating responsibility among concurrent tortfeasors and rejected appeals to
preserve to plaintiffs the historic benefits of joint and several liability.36' By
allowing for a public policy exception to the statutory command of several liability,
the legislature encouraged litigants to seek to expand the scope of joint and several
liability, but the courts to date have shown no enthusiasm for the task.
Statutory Causes of Action
Legislation affects common law causes of action in different ways. Some statutes
acknowledge a common law cause of action but adjust the elements or defenses.362
The common law that has not been modified continues to apply to the cause of
action.363 Other statutes substitute a new statutory cause of action for an existing
common law cause of action 364 or create a cause of action unknown to the common
law.365 Issues then arise as to whether common law principles, such as comparative
negligence, apply to the statutory cause of action and whether the Several Liability
Act affects the statutory cause of action. In addition, the legislative intent in creating
or modifying causes of action may significantly influence the application of the
public policy exception in the Several Liability Act.
The Dram Shop Act of New Mexico exemplifies the complicated relationships
among a statute addressing a particular cause of action, the Several Liability Act,
and the common law defense of comparative negligence. New Mexico law has
360. In Sarracino v. Martinez, 117 N.M. 193, 870 P.2d 155 (Ct. App. 1994), the court recognized that a
person who takes charge of a helpless person has a duty of care to protect the person. The defendant agreed to take
the intoxicated plaintiff home and defendant's subsequent negligence allowed an intentional wrongdoer to assault
the plaintiff. In Davis v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Doila Ana County, 127 N.M. 785, 987 P.2d 1172 (Ct. App.
1999), the plaintiff was sexually assaulted by an employee at a psychiatric hospital who had been hired by the
hospital based on favorable recommendations given by his former supervisors at the Dofia Ana County Detention
Center. Although the detention center had disciplined the employee for sexual harassment, the positive
recommendation given to the hospital by the officers was unqualified. In recognizing a duty to protect those who
could be harmed by the recommendation, the court did not rule on the issue of whether the detention center would
be liable for the acts of the assaulter. In De Matteo v. Simon, 112 N.M. 112, 812 P.2d 361 (Ct. App. 1991), the court
ruled that one who negligently entrusts a vehicle to a person is liable for harm done when the driver's negligence
causes injury to a third person. The court did not address the issue of whether the negligent entruster could lay off
fault on the negligent driver.
361. Bartlett, 98 N.M. at 158, 646 P.2d at 585.
362. For example, the original Dram Shop Act, ch. 328, 1983 N.M. Laws 2103, provided certain limitations
upon the common law cause of action first recognized in Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 1269 (1982): "The
title and entire tenor of the statute represents a legislative intent to narrow the scope of tavernkeeper and social host
liability. The statute was an obvious response to Lopez." Trujillo v. Trujillo, 104 N.M. 379, 383, 721 P.2d 1310,
1314 (Ct. App. 1986).
363. Trujillo, 104 N.M. at 383, 721 P.2d at 1314.
364. Pedrazza v. Sid Fleming Contractor, Inc., 94 N.M. 59, 61, 607 P.2d 597, 599 (1980) ("Workers'
compensation statutes, for example, provide the exclusive remedy for a worker against his employer and "all other
common law and statutory actions are barred by the Act.").
365. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN, §§ 57-12-1-57-12-22 (Michie 2000) (Unfair Practices Act).
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evolved from a complete bar against recovery from a licensee who serves
intoxicated patrons who then get into auto accidents366 to a mixture of statutory
claims and common law claims partially modified by statute. Currently, a licensee
who serves an intoxicated patron can be liable to an innocent third person injured
by the patron's negligence if the third person can demonstrate that the licensee
violated the standard of reasonable care defined in the Dram Shop Act.3 67 The
intoxicated patron-driver, however, may recover for his injuries from the licensee
only if the licensee was guilty of gross negligence and reckless disregard of the
safety of the patron-driver.3 68 When two patrons each become intoxicated and one
drives while the other is a passenger in the vehicle, the intoxicated patron-passenger
need not prove gross negligence and reckless disregard for safety but can recover
upon a showing that the licensee breached the statutorily defined standard of
reasonable care.
Left unanswered by the Dram Shop Act are questions concerning the defense of
comparative negligence and the applicability of the Several Liability Act. Because
the claim of the innocent third person against the licensee is a common law action
in which only the licensee's standard of care has been modified by the Dram Shop
Act, 370 it is most probable that the common law defense of comparative negligence
will be available to the licensee.37' This, in turn, means that the Several Liability Act
will apply and the licensee will be able to lay off fault on the intoxicated driver
unless the public policy exception is invoked to bar the licensee from shifting part
of the blame on the intoxicated driver. 372 The same result will occur when a licensee
continues to serve alcohol to both the driver and a passenger, and the passenger later
sues the licensee for injuries caused by the intoxication of the driver.3 73
The cause of action of the intoxicated patron-driver, in contrast, is solely a
creation of the Dram Shop Act,3 74 which requires that the driver establish that the
366. Hall v. Budagher, 76 NM. 591,417 P.2d 71 (1966); Marchiondo v. Roper, 90 N.M. 367, 563 P.2d 1160
(1977).
367. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-11-1 (A) (Michie 1996).
368. Id. § 41-11-1 (B) (Michie 1996).
369. Murphy v. Tomada, Enter., Inc., 112 N.M. 800, 819 P.2d 1358 (1991). See also Baxter, 107 N.M. 48,
752 P.2d 240.
370. Baxter, 107 N.M. at 50, 752 P.2d at 242 ("The enactment of Section 41-11-1-1 in 1983 did not create
or abolish a cause of action; instead it narrowed the liability of tavernkeepers ... [and] set out the elements which
could constitute a breach of the duty established in Lopez.").
371. No case so holds, but the court in Baxter held that when an intoxicated passenger sued the licensee who
served the intoxicated driver, the licensee could avail itself of the defense of comparative negligence "because the
action sounds in negligence and because fault is the predicate for liability" under the Dram Shop Act. Baxter, 107
N.M. at 52, 752 P.2d at 244. The rationale for the application of comparative negligence is equally applicable
whether the action is brought by an intoxicated patron or by a third person whose negligence combines with that
of the licensee to cause injury to that person.
372. Unless a statutory exception so provides, the Several Liability Act applies to all causes of action "to
which the doctrine of comparative fault applies." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1 (A) (Michie 1996).
373. In Baxter, 107 N.M. 48, 752 P.2d 240, the court held that the intoxicated passenger had a common law
cause of action against a licensee who violated the standard of care set in the Dram Shop Act, and that the
passenger's intoxication provided a partial defense as a form of comparative negligence: "[Wie hold that because
the action sounds in negligence and because fault is a predicate for liability under Section 41-11-1 (A), comparative
negligence theories must govern this case." Id. at 52, 752 P.2d at 244.
374. In creating the common law action against the licensee, the supreme court limited its holding to cases
in which the breach of the duty of care of the licensee in serving the intoxicated person "is found to be the proximate
cause of injuries to a third person." Lopez, 98 N.M. at 632, 651 P.2d at 1276 (emphasis added). The original 1983
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licensee was guilty of both gross negligence and reckless disregard of the safety of
the patron-driver.375 The Act does not state whether the comparative negligence of
the patron-driver is an affirmative defense available to the licensee and thus also
does not resolve the issue of the availability of the Several Liability Act to the
patron-driver's statutory cause of action. There can be little doubt, however, that the
patron-driver's damage award will be reduced by the percentage of fault of the
patron-driver. There is no reason to treat the drunk driver more favorably than the
innocent third party or the intoxicated patron-passenger, both of whom are subject
to the defense.376
Because comparative negligence is a defense to each of the three categories of
plaintiffs who may sue the licensee,377 the Several Liability Act applies.37 Unless
the public policy exception applies, 379 the licensee will be able to lay off fault on the
intoxicated patron-driver when sued by the innocent third party, the patron-
passenger, or the patron-driver. At first blush, the public policy exception seems
unlikely to apply. In Reichert v. Atler,3" ° the supreme court rejected the application
of the public policy exception and allowed the bar owner to lay off fault on an
intoxicated patron who shot the plaintiff. Reichert is distinguishable in one
important manner, however. In Reichert, the plaintiff framed the case against the bar
as a premises liability case rather than as a case asserting liability pursuant to the
Dram Shop Act.38' The policies that underlie the Dram Shop Act are sufficiently
compelling to lead to a different result from a case involving only premises liability.
The policy rationale supporting joint and several liability in Saiz v. Belen School
District82 equally supports the conclusion that the licensee should be jointly and
severally liable with the intoxicated patron who injures third persons. In Saiz, the
court held an employer of an independent contractorjointly and severally liable both
for the employer's liability and for that of the independent contractor when the
employer hired an independent contractor to undertake inherently dangerous
version of the Dram Shop Act did not provide a remedy for the intoxicated patron. Trujillo, 104 N.M. at 382, 721
P.2d at 1313. In 1985 the legislature amended the act to provide a cause of action for the intoxicated patron who
could demonstrate that the licensee was guilty of gross negligence and reckless disregard for the safety of the
intoxicated patron. Act of Apr. 4, 1985, ch. 191, N.M. Laws, 1035. The same provision continues in the current
version of the statute. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-11-1(B) (Michie 1996).
375. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-11-1(B) (Michie 1996).
376. The court in Baxter, 107 N.M. 48, 752 P.2d 240, held that when an intoxicated passenger sued the
licensee who served the intoxicated driver, the licensee could avail itself of the defense of comparative negligence
"because the action sounds in negligence and because fault is the predicate for liability" under the Dram Shop Act.
Id. at 52, 752 P.2d at 244. The rationale for the application of comparative negligence is equally applicable whether
the action is brought by an intoxicated patron or by a third person whose negligence combines with that of the
licensee to cause injury to that person. Though the intoxicated patron's cause of action is solely a creation of statute,
the statutory cause of action also "sounds in negligence" and bases liability upon fault, id., and thus should also be
subject to the defense of comparative negligence.
377. Omitted from this discussion is the separate question of whether comparative negligence and several
liability apply to claims brought against social hosts pursuant to the Dram Shop Act. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-Il1 -
I(E) (Michie 1996).
378. Id. § 41-3A-I(A).
379: Id. § 41-3A-I(C)(4) (Michie 1996).
380. 117 N.M. 623, 875 P.2d 379 (1994).
381. Plaintiff "alleged that the [licensees] breached a duty to provide adequate security to protect patrons of
the bar." Id. at 624, 875 P.2d at 380.
382. 113 N.M. 387, 827 P.2d 102.
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activities.383 The court grounded this exception to several liability in the public
policy "to protect third persons in an area of inherent danger and to encourage
conscientious adherence to standards of safety where injury likely will result in the
absence of precautions."3 "Inherently dangerous" activities are those in which there
is a "high probability or relative certainty that harm will arise in the absence of
reasonable precautions. ' '385
Liquor licensees who negligently serve intoxicated patrons fit within the Saiz
rationale forjoint and several liability. It is a violation of the Liquor Control Act for
a licensee to serve a person if the licensee knows or should know that the person is
already intoxicated.386 Such conduct is also criminal.387 It is indisputable that
violation of these statutes is an inherently dangerous activity because the violation
creates a high probability that harm will result, particularly in New Mexico. 88
Moreover, the Liquor Control Act seeks to encourage conscientious adherence to
safety. The legislature has declared that the sale of alcoholic beverages in New
Mexico must be regulated "to protect the public health, safety and morals of every
community in the state. 389
In addition to the Saiz rationale, explicit legislative intent demands that licensees
be jointly and severally liable with intoxicated patrons whom they serve. The
legislature has declared that "[i]t is the intent of the Liquor Control Act that each
person to whom a license is issued shall be fully liable and accountable for the use
of the license, including but not limited to liability for all violations of the Liquor
Control Act." 390 The command to make licensees fully liable and the subsequent
adoption of the Several Liability Act containing the public policy exception strongly
suggest that the legislature has concluded that joint and several liability should apply
under the public policy exception of the Several Liability Act in tort actions based
upon violations of the Liquor Control Act. Had Reichert been litigated as a Dram
Shop Act case instead of as a premises liability case, therefore, the result might have
been different.
The application of joint and several liability in Dram Shop Act cases would make
common sense, as well as legal sense. There is a qualitative difference between a
premises liability case and a Dram Shop Act action. In the premises liability case,
the owner's fault merely consists of failing to use care to protect patrons from harm
by third persons. In the Dram Shop lawsuit, the licensee's fault consists of actively
participating in the creation of a menacing third person by providing an intoxicated
383. Id. at 400, 827 P.2d at 115.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 396, 827 P.2d at 111.
386. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-7A-16 (Michie 2001).
387. Id. § 60-7A-25.
388. A recent New Mexico study showed that "51% of the DUIs (1,585) interviewed had been drinking inbars prior to their subsequent arrest." Moises Vegas, Availability Drives New Mexicans to Drink, ALBUQUERQUE
J., Nov. 2, 2002, at A13 (citing Sandra Lapham et al., Factors Relating to Miles Driven Between Drinking and
Arrest Locations Among Convicted Drunk Drivers, 30 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS ANDPREVENTION 201,203-04 (1998)).
389. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-3A-2 (Michie 2001).
390. Id. § 60-3A-2 (emphasis added). Although the supreme court did not create a common law cause of
action for dram shop liability until the year after passage of the Liquor Control Act in 1981, Lopez, 98 N.M 625,651 P.2d 1269, the legislature made clear that public policy demands that liquor licensees be fully liable for
violations of the Act, including breach of the prohibition on serving intoxicated patrons.
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person with alcoholic beverages."' In effect, the licensee creates a monster and then
seeks to lay off fault on his creation. It makes no sense to allow that result in light
of Saiz and of the New Mexico Legislature's declaration of policy to require full
liability.
Imposing joint and several liability on the licensee will not result in a windfall
benefit to the intoxicated patron. If the intoxicated patron-driver sues the licensee
for injuries to the driver, the licensee can avail himself of the defense of the
comparative negligence of the patron-driver to reduce his liability.392 When a third
person is injured and sues, the intoxicated driver should be fully liable for the
plaintiffs compensable injuries even though the licensee also is fully liable.393
Moreover, the intoxicated driver will be subject to a claim for contribution by the
licensee who pays the joint and several judgment. 94
CONCLUSION
The New Mexico Legislature has chosen to link the application of several liability
to causes of action to which the defense of comparative negligence applies. 95 That
choice is consistent with the New Mexico Supreme Court's decision in Scott to
apply comparative negligence as well as the Scott court's implicitly adopted several
liability doctrine39 "if negligence or negligence-related concepts are a basis for
liability." '397 The decision is also consistent with the Bartlett court's explicit adoption
of several liability "in a comparative negligence case." '398
391. That the intoxication results from the active participation of the licensee who serves the drinks and the
patron who consumes them suggests an alternative route to achieve joint and several liability. In some ways, this
cooperative effort to achieve the goal of intoxication is analogous to a joint venture. See Roderick v. Lake, 108 N.M.
696, 778 P.2d 443 (Ct. App. 1989), cer. denied, 108 N.M. 681, 777 P.2d 1325. Participants in a joint venture are
probably jointly and severally liable for all acts of each member in furtherance of the common goal, id. at 700, 778
P.2d at 447 ("[a]ssuming without deciding, that a joint venture between two or more tortfeasors would make themjointly and severally liable"), thus coming within the joint and several liability exception for persons vicariously
liable. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1(B) (Michie 1996).
392. The intoxicated patron-driver must establish that the licensee was guilty of gross negligence and reckless
disregard of safety in order to recover. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-1 1(B) (Michie 1996). Even a grossly negligent
defendant can avail itself of comparative negligence. See Scott, 96 N.M. at 687, 634 P.2d at 1239 (noting that in
assessing comparative fault, the distinction between gross negligence and ordinary negligence is abolished). The
intoxicated patron-passenger who sues the licensee also would continue to be subject to the defense of comparative
negligence. Baxter, 107 N.M. 48, 752 P,2d 240.
393. The arguments in favor of joint and several liability focus on the reasons that the licensee should be fully
liable for the harm done to third persons at the hands of the intoxicated patron. Whether the intoxicated person
should also be jointly and severally liable is a separate question. The Saiz rationale suggests that the intoxicated
patron should also be jointly and severally liable. The patron-driver's conduct is certainly inherently dangerous as
that phrase is defined in Saiz, 113 N.M. at 396, 827 P.2d at 11, and the legislative determination that drunk driving
is a crime, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102 (Michie 2002), seeks to protect the public from the perils of drunk driving.
When the intoxicated patron causes harm to others in ways unconnected to driving, as occurred in Reichert, where
the intoxicated person shot a fellow patron, a separate analysis of the rationale for holding the intoxicated patron
fully liable will be necessary.
394. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-2 (Michie 1996) (stating that a joint tortfeasor who pays judgment is
entitled to contribution based on comparative fault from other tortfeasors).
395. Id. § 41-3A-I(A).
396. The Scott court foreshadowed several liability when it declared that "[i]n multiple party cases,
interrogatories will address the question of liability between each plaintiff and each defendant, to reflect such
apportionment [based on comparative fault]." Scott, 96 N.M. at 688, 634 P.2d at 1240.
397. Id.
398. "The question is whether, in a comparative negligence case, a concurrent tortfeasor is liable for the entire
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Linking several liability to causes of action in which the defense of comparative
negligence applies has posed problems. First, determining whether comparative
negligence is a defense to particular causes of action often is not easy: The courts
have never addressed the issue as to some causes of action, and where they had
previously held that contributory negligence was not a defense, the courts have to
reconsider the ruling in light of the ameliorating effect of comparative negligence.
Second, as to some causes of action in which several liability is not applicable
because comparative negligence is not a defense, the courts have had to create new
doctrines to redistribute losses that are now imposed fully on a defendant who is
jointly liable.399 Finally, the cause of action-by-cause of action approach has
complicated litigation in which plaintiffs pursue multiple theories of liability, some
of which are subject to several liability while others are subject to joint and several
liability.
The Third Restatement approach largely ignores differences among causes of
action and instead broadly imposes several liability for almost all causes of action
for almost all types of damages.4" The drafters of the Restatement concede that there
is some merit to a cause of action-by-cause of action approach such as that of New
Mexico because when "states of mind or culpability change, the policy concerns of
tort law also change.""'' Nonetheless, the Restatement opts for pragmatism over
theory: "[A] litigation system must be workable. It does little to advance underlying
policy goals to have a system that is too complex for trial courts and jurors.. .to
implement. '4 °2
Despite twenty years of experience with New Mexico's approach to the
determination of the scope of the several liability doctrine, it is still too early to
determine whether the practical difficulties of the cause of action-by-cause of action
approach will outweigh the benefits that flow from maintaining traditional
distinctions between different causes of action. If changes become necessary, the
Several Liability Act may provide sufficient flexibility for accommodating practical
concerns while maintaining doctrinal consistency. The Act's public policy
exception"' is an invitation to and an opportunity for the judiciary to make any
changes in the scope of the doctrine of several liability that are appropriate in light
of the practical problems that might surface in the future. Indeed, the Third
Restatement and jurisdictions considering adoption of the Third Restatement would
benefit from the inclusion of an explicit public policy exception in Tracks A and B,
the portions of the Restatement that deal with comparative fault and several liability.
damage caused by concurrent tortfeasors." Bartlett, 98 N.M. at 154, 646 P.2d at 583.
399. See, e.g., In re Consolidated Vista Hills Retaining Wall Litig., 119 N.M. 542, 893 P.2d 438 (1995).
400. The Restatement "applies to all claims.. .for death, personal injury (including emotional distress or
consortium), or physical damage to tangible property, regardless of the basis of liability." RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 1 (2000). Another section of the Restatement provides an exception for
claims for intentional torts. Id. § 10. Another exception applies when the damages consist of "purely intangible
economic loss." Id. § I cmt. b.
401. Id. § I cmt. b.
402. Id.
403. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-i(C)(4) (Michie 1996).
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